Mere pendency of criminal cases cannot, without more, justify denial of public appointment.

Pursuant to an advertisement dated 24 August 2021 issued by the Uttarakhand Subordinate Service Selection Commission (UKSSSC), the petitioner applied for appointment as a Driver and submitted his application on 11 September 2021.

He was selected after the driving test, and his name was recommended to the Forest Department, subject to departmental document verification.

The petitioner appeared for document verification on 30 August 2024 with the required original documents, which were verified; however, he was not appointed, although nine similarly situated candidates were appointed.

The petitioner submitted a representation dated 10 October 2024 seeking appointment and reasons for the denial.

During the pendency of his first writ petition, the representation was rejected on 3 January 2025 on the ground that police and Local Intelligence Unit reports were adverse because two criminal cases were pending against him.

The cases arose from FIR No. 0055 of 2023 under Sections 379 and 411 IPC and FIR No. 0316 of 2023 under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC, both registered after the petitioner’s application had been submitted.

The first case was compounded pursuant to a compromise dated 19 July 2024, resulting in the petitioner’s acquittal, while the second case remained pending at the trial stage.

The petitioner challenged the rejection order and the denial of appointment in the two connected writ petitions.

Whether the petitioner had suppressed material information by failing to disclose the two criminal cases when both FIRs were registered after submission of his application?

Whether the pendency of one criminal case, coupled with an adverse police/LIU report, justified denial of appointment under Rule 13 of the Uttaranchal Sarkari Vibhag Driver Seva Niyamawali, 2003?

Whether the appointing authority independently applied its satisfaction regarding the petitioner’s character, or merely adopted the opinion expressed in the police and LIU reports?

The Court applied Rule 13 of the Uttaranchal Sarkari Vibhag Driver Seva Niyamawali, 2003, under which a candidate’s character must be such as to render him suitable in every respect for government employment, with the appointing authority required to satisfy itself regarding the candidate’s character.

Police and LIU reports are material for consideration but do not themselves constitute the appointing authority’s final satisfaction; the appointing authority must independently assess the candidate’s suitability.

The Court further applied the principle that mere pendency of a criminal case, without conviction, does not by itself disqualify a candidate from appointment, particularly where the pending allegations do not involve established moral turpitude.

In relation to the compounded case, the Court noted the effect of Section 320(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which compounding has the effect of an acquittal.

The Court found that there was no suppression because both FIRs were registered in 2023, whereas the petitioner had submitted his application in 2021; therefore, he could not have suppressed cases that did not exist when the application was filed.

The Court also noted that the petitioner was not asked to furnish information regarding the subsequent FIRs at the time of document verification.

One criminal case had already been compounded and had resulted in acquittal, while the other remained pending without any conviction.

Applying Rule 13, the Court held that the police and LIU could only submit reports, and that the appointing authority was required to independently record its satisfaction regarding the petitioner’s character.

The impugned order merely relied on the negative police and LIU reports and concluded that appointment would not be justified, without undertaking the required independent assessment.

Consequently, the denial of appointment solely on the basis of the pending case and the adverse reports was held unsustainable.

Both writ petitions were allowed.

The order dated 3 January 2025 rejecting the petitioner’s representation was quashed, and the respondents were directed to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner within one month from 22 September 2026.