The 1995 Career Advancement Scheme impliedly repealed the 1986 Time-Bound Promotion Statute.

The petitioners were university teachers appointed as Lecturers between 1979 and 1982 and subsequently promoted as Readers under the 1986 Time-Bound Promotion Statute. They claimed promotion from Reader to University Professor under the same Statute, as amended in 1987, after completing the prescribed period of service and possessing the requisite qualifications.

The 1995 Career Advancement Scheme replaced the earlier time-bound promotion framework. The petitioners contended that the 1995 Scheme dealt only with promotion or placement up to the post of Reader and did not expressly repeal the 1986 provisions concerning promotion from Reader to University Professor.

Their claims were rejected pursuant to departmental guidelines dated 14 December 2018, which treated 22 September 1995 as the terminal date for benefits under the 1986 scheme. The authorities relied upon the Division Bench judgment in L.P.A. No. 658 of 2018, which held that the 1986 Statute had been impliedly repealed by the 1995 Statute.

The learned Single Judge referred the matters to a Division Bench on the ground that Sections 22, 23, 34, 35 and 36 of the Jharkhand State University Act had allegedly not been considered in L.P.A. No. 658 of 2018. The present Division Bench heard both writ petitions together.

Whether the 1986 Time-Bound Promotion Statute was impliedly repealed by the 1995 Career Advancement Scheme and, if so, whether the petitioners could claim promotion under the repealed Statute?

Whether the Division Bench judgment in L.P.A. No. 658 of 2018 was rendered without considering the implications of Sections 22, 23, 24, 35 and 36 of the Jharkhand State University Act, and whether those provisions affected the issue of repeal?

Whether the departmental guidelines dated 14 December 2018, fixing 22 September 1995 as the cut-off date for promotion under the 1986 scheme, were legally sustainable?

The Court applied the doctrine of implied repeal, under which a later statutory instrument operating in the same field and providing a substantially different framework may supersede an earlier enactment, even without an express repeal clause.

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was applied to preserve prior operation, accrued rights and liabilities arising under a repealed enactment, unless a contrary intention appears; however, a mere eligibility to claim a future benefit does not constitute an accrued right.

The Court relied on State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh, (2011) 5 SCC 305, concerning the effect of repeal; State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, as quoted in BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287, on the application of Section 6 where repeal is followed by fresh legislation; Air India v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 734, on the survival of subordinate legislation and accrued rights; and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector, (2007) 5 SCC 447, on the protection of rights acquired under a repealed enactment.

Sections 34 and 36 of the Jharkhand State University Act were understood as governing the authority and procedure for framing University Statutes, while Sections 22, 23 and 35 concerned the Syndicate, its powers, and financial or governmental approval requirements.

The Court also treated the earlier decision in L.P.A. No. 658 of 2018 as binding and final, as it had not been challenged before the Supreme Court.

The Court held that the 1986 Statute and the 1995 Scheme operated in the same general field of career advancement and pay-scale upgradation. Although the 1995 Scheme did not expressly mention promotion from Reader to University Professor, permitting the 1986 scheme to continue would result in two parallel eligibility regimes for comparable advancement benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the earlier finding that the 1986 Statute stood impliedly repealed upon the commencement of the 1995 Scheme.

The petitioners had been promoted as Readers under the 1986 Statute, but their claimed promotion to Professor accrued only upon completion of the requisite service and consideration by the competent authorities. Since they had no crystallised right to such promotion before repeal, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act did not preserve their claim.

The Court further held that Sections 22, 23, 34, 35 and 36 of the University Act did not directly regulate the continued operation of the 1986 Statute. Section 34 merely conferred power to frame Statutes, and Section 36 prescribed the procedure for making, amending or repealing them; neither provision prevented a later Statute from superseding the earlier one.

The departmental guidelines fixing 22 September 1995 as the terminal date were consequently consistent with the 1995 framework and the binding decision in L.P.A. No. 658 of 2018. The absence of a University Professor nomenclature in the 1995 Scheme did not revive the repealed 1986 promotional route or create an enforceable right in favour of the petitioners.

The alleged non-consideration of Sections 22, 23, 24, 35 and 36 of the University Act did not invalidate the earlier Division Bench decision, as those provisions had no direct nexus with the question of repeal.

The departmental guidelines dated 14 December 2018, including the cut-off date of 22 September 1995, were upheld. Both writ petitions were dismissed, and any pending interlocutory applications were also dismissed.