Mere presence in a compromising position does not establish adultery or justify divorce.

The appellant-husband and respondent no. 1-wife were married on 02 July 2006 and had a male child born in 2010.

The husband alleged that, after the child’s birth, the wife subjected him to cruelty and maintained an illicit relationship with the husband of her elder sister. He claimed to have seen them in a compromising position. He further alleged that, on 30 March 2013, the wife’s father and others forcibly took her away with her belongings, after which she deserted him.

On these grounds, he sought dissolution of marriage under Sections 13(1)(i) and 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

The wife denied the allegations, contending that the accusation of an illicit relationship was fabricated and itself amounted to cruelty. She also alleged that the husband had attempted to kill her by poisoning and stated that a local settlement had not been honoured by him.

The Principal Judge, Family Court, Madhubani dismissed M.M. Case No. 86 of 2013, later renumbered as M.M. Case No. 49 of 2017, by judgment and decree dated 04 April 2024. The husband preferred the present appeal.

Whether the respondent-wife treated the appellant-husband with cruelty after solemnization of the marriage, within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

Whether the appellant proved that the respondent-wife had sexual intercourse with a person other than her spouse, thereby attracting Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

Whether the appellant was entitled to a decree of divorce on the pleaded grounds?

The Court applied Sections 13(1)(i) and 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Section 13(1)(i) permits divorce where, after solemnization of marriage, a spouse has sexual intercourse with a person other than the spouse, while Section 13(1)(ia) concerns cruelty.

Relying on Hargovind Soni v. Ramdulari, 1985 SCC OnLine MP 109, the Court stated that adultery is ordinarily established through circumstantial evidence, non-access, birth of a child, venereal disease, confession or admission, and requires clear proof excluding reasonable alternative inferences; a mere probability or the husband’s uncorroborated bald statement is insufficient.

The Court further observed that, although matrimonial issues are generally decided on a preponderance of probabilities, adultery, in its view, required proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Allegations of cruelty must also be specific and proved, rather than vague, omnibus allegations.

The Court found that the husband’s allegation that he saw the wife and her brother-in-law in a “compromising position” did not establish the distinct statutory requirement of sexual intercourse under Section 13(1)(i).

The husband neither lodged a police complaint or sanha nor made any contemporaneous complaint to matrimonial relatives after the alleged incident. His parents and other relatives also did not support the allegation.

Applying the evidentiary principles stated in Hargovind Soni, the Court held that the accusation of adultery was unsupported by clear or corroborative evidence.

Since the cruelty allegation substantially rested on the same unproved accusation of an illicit relationship, it was regarded as vague, omnibus and incapable of sustaining a finding of cruelty.

The Court therefore found no error in the Family Court’s dismissal of the matrimonial case.

The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and decree dated 04 April 2024 of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Madhubani, dismissing the matrimonial case, were affirmed.