Mere suspicion may justify charge framing where occurrence is admitted, despite a counter-case.

The prosecution alleged that on 24 March 2016, the six petitioners, armed with weapons including a bhala, garansha and lathis, came to the informant’s house with an intention to kill him and assaulted the informant’s brothers when they intervened. It was further alleged that the accused removed a suitcase, box and household articles from the informant’s house.

On the basis of the informant’s statement, Moro P.S. Case No. 15 of 2016 was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 343, 324, 307, 379 and 504 of the IPC.

The petitioners filed an application under Section 239 CrPC seeking discharge, which was rejected by the learned A.C.J.M.-IV, Darbhanga, on 30 January 2018 in G.R. No. 958 of 2016 corresponding to Trial No. 1050 of 2018.

Their criminal revision under Sections 397 and 399 CrPC was thereafter dismissed by the District and Sessions Judge, Darbhanga, on 12 October 2018 in Criminal Revision No. 97 of 2018.

Whether the orders rejecting the petitioners’ application for discharge under Section 239 CrPC and their revision under Sections 397 and 399 CrPC warranted interference by the High Court?

Whether the allegations and materials disclosed sufficient grounds for framing charges, including under Section 307 IPC, notwithstanding the petitioners’ contention that the occurrence was a free fight and that both parties had sustained injuries?

The Court considered Section 239 CrPC, which permits discharge where the Magistrate finds the accusation to be groundless, and Sections 397 and 399 CrPC governing revisional jurisdiction.

Relying on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Court applied the principle that, at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to conduct a detailed examination of the evidence or determine guilt; a strong or grave suspicion arising from the prosecution materials may justify framing of charge.

The Court further noted that the existence of a counter-case or injuries on both sides does not, by itself, eliminate the prosecution case at the discharge stage.

The High Court found that the occurrence itself was not denied by the petitioners and that a counter-case had also been lodged by their side, indicating that the incident was not wholly disputed.

The allegations that the petitioners came armed, assaulted the informant and the intervening injured persons, and removed household articles disclosed sufficient material requiring trial.

Applying the limited scope of scrutiny at the stage of discharge, the Court held that the competing claim that the incident was a free fight, the presence of injuries on both sides, and the petitioners’ challenge to the applicability of Section 307 IPC were matters to be assessed during trial rather than grounds for discharge.

Since the revisional court had considered the relevant provisions and supplied reasons for rejecting the revision, its order could not be characterised as perverse.

The application seeking quashing of the orders dated 30 January 2018 and 12 October 2018 was accordingly dismissed.

A copy of the judgment was directed to be communicated to the trial court forthwith.