Mere use of a firearm does not attract Section 27 Arms Act without proving contravention of Sections 5 or 7.

On 25 November 2004, Dev Chand, Gokal Chand and Paramjit Singh were travelling in a jeep when another jeep allegedly intercepted them near Kumar Filling Station, Abohar. Anand Kumar allegedly fired two shots from a .12-bore firearm, one of which struck Paramjit Singh on the neck and occipital region, while the other hit the jeep. Vinay Kumar and Shagan Lal allegedly participated in the assault while armed with dangs, and Dev Chand and Gokal Chand sustained blunt-force injuries. The prosecution attributed the occurrence to a dispute concerning the operation and forfeiture of security relating to a liquor vend.

An FIR was registered under Sections 307, 365, 342, 323, 148 and 149 IPC, along with provisions of the Arms Act. During investigation, certain accused were found innocent, while others were summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Trial was ultimately conducted against eight accused.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur convicted Anand Kumar under Sections 307 and 323 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, and convicted Vinay Kumar and Shagan Lal under Sections 307/34 and 323 IPC. Other accused were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

The convicted accused filed an appeal challenging their convictions, while injured witness Gokal Chand filed a revision seeking enhancement of sentence.

Whether the delay in registration of the FIR created a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case?

Whether the use of a firearm causing a non-fatal and simple injury was sufficient to attract Section 307 IPC?

Whether the absence of recovery of the firearm or pellets, and alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, warranted acquittal?

Whether Vinay Kumar and Shagan Lal could be convicted under Sections 307/34 and 323 IPC despite the absence of attribution of a specific blow to either accused?

Whether Anand Kumar’s conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act could be sustained when the firearm was not recovered and the prosecution did not prove contravention of Sections 5 or 7 of the Arms Act?

Whether the sentence imposed by the trial Court required enhancement in the revision filed by Gokal Chand?

The Court applied Section 307 IPC, under which the determining factor is the intention or knowledge accompanying the act, rather than the mere severity or eventual result of the injury.

It applied Section 34 IPC, holding that individual attribution of each injury is unnecessary where participation in an assault carried out pursuant to a common intention is established.

The Court relied on the evidentiary principle that credible testimony of injured witnesses carries substantial weight when corroborated by medical evidence.

Following State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh, (2011) 9 SCC 115, and Nankaunoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 317, it held that non-recovery of the weapon or pellets is not fatal where reliable ocular and medical evidence exists.

It also relied on Uma Shankar Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2014 INSC 847, for the principle that acquittal of co-accused does not automatically entitle another accused to acquittal if the evidence against him is independently sufficient.

Under the post-1988 amendment scheme of Section 27 of the Arms Act, as explained in Surinder Singh v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (2021) 20 SCC 24, mere use of a firearm for an unlawful purpose is insufficient; the prosecution must prove use in contravention of Section 5 or Section 7 of the Act.

The Court held that the FIR delay was satisfactorily explained by the injured persons first being taken to their village, thereafter to the hospital, and by the time required to ascertain their fitness for making statements; there was no material suggesting deliberation or fabrication.

The firearm injury to Paramjit Singh was medically established, and its location on the neck and back of the head, coupled with the allegation that two shots were fired, demonstrated the requisite intention or knowledge for Section 307 IPC, notwithstanding that the injury was not fatal.

The absence of pellet recovery or non-recovery of the firearm did not discredit the consistent testimony of the injured eyewitnesses because it was materially corroborated by medical evidence.

As to Vinay Kumar and Shagan Lal, the Court found that both were consistently described as armed with dangs and participating in the group assault. The blunt-force injuries suffered by Dev Chand and Gokal Chand corroborated this account. Section 34 IPC did not require proof of the precise blow inflicted by each accused once their participation in the common assault and shared intention were established.

The acquittal of other accused was distinguishable because the evidence against them was weaker or lacked specific attribution.

However, the Court distinguished the proof required under Section 27 of the Arms Act from the proof of firearm use under Section 307 IPC. Although the firing itself was proved, the prosecution neither recovered the firearm nor established that it was unlicensed, prohibited, or used in contravention of Section 5 or Section 7 of the Arms Act. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 27 could not stand.

The Court further found no sufficient ground to enhance the sentences imposed by the trial Court.

The conviction of Anand Kumar under Section 27 of the Arms Act was set aside, and he was acquitted of that charge because contravention of Sections 5 or 7 of the Arms Act was not proved.

The sentences under Sections 307, 307/34 and 323 IPC were maintained and directed to run concurrently, with set-off for the period already undergone.

Gokal Chand’s revision petition seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed.

The appellants, who were on bail, were directed to be re-arrested to serve the remaining sentence.