Mere use of a sharp weapon does not establish attempt to murder without requisite intent.

On 27 January 1997, the appellants allegedly damaged the informant’s fence and attempted to encroach upon his land.

When the informant objected, appellant Keshaba allegedly assaulted the informant’s brother, Sudhir Palei (P.W.2), with a katuri aimed at his neck.

P.W.2 raised his hand to ward off the blow and sustained an incised injury on the dorsum of his left hand.

Appellants Arjuna and Dhadu allegedly assaulted the informant (P.W.1) with lathis, causing simple injuries.

The prosecution examined six witnesses, including the informant, the injured witness, independent witnesses and the medical officer; the Investigating Officer was not examined as he had died before trial.

The trial court convicted Keshaba under Section 307 IPC and Arjuna and Dhadu under Section 323 IPC, sentencing them to three years’ and three months’ rigorous imprisonment respectively, while acquitting them of the other charges.

1. Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Keshaba possessed the intention or knowledge necessary to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC?

2. Whether the non-examination of the Investigating Officer caused prejudice to the appellants and undermined the prosecution case?

3. Whether the evidence nevertheless established that Keshaba voluntarily caused hurt by means of a dangerous weapon, attracting Section 324 IPC?

4. Whether the convictions of Arjuna and Dhadu under Section 323 IPC were sustainable on the oral and medical evidence?

5. Whether, having regard to the prolonged pendency of the appeal, the nature of the offences and the appellants’ subsequent conduct, they were entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958?

Section 307 IPC requires proof of the intention or knowledge contemplated by the provision; the mere use of a sharp or dangerous weapon is insufficient, and intention must be inferred from circumstances such as the weapon used, the targeted body part, the nature of the injury and the manner of assault.

Where the evidence proves voluntary causing of hurt by a dangerous weapon but does not establish an attempt to cause death, conviction may be recorded under Section 324 IPC.

Simple hurt caused voluntarily is punishable under Section 323 IPC.

Non-examination of an Investigating Officer is not invariably fatal where the officer’s absence is satisfactorily explained and no material prejudice is shown.

Under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, a court must consider release on probation where the offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life; Section 361 CrPC requires special reasons where probation could have been granted but is refused.

In Chellammal v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 INSC 540, the Supreme Court held that consideration of probation is a statutory obligation, though its grant remains discretionary, and refusal must be supported by reasons.

Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act permits payment of compensation to victims.

The Court accepted that Keshaba assaulted P.W.2 with a katuri, because the injured witness’s account was corroborated by P.W.1 and by the medical evidence showing an incised wound caused by a sharp weapon.

However, the Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the requisite intention or knowledge for Section 307 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

P.W.1’s assertion that the accused had threatened to kill Sudhir was not supported by P.W.2, the injured victim; further, the blow did not land on the neck, the injury was skin-deep and was not certified as dangerous to life.

These circumstances justified altering the conviction to Section 324 IPC rather than acquitting Keshaba altogether.

The Court upheld the convictions of Arjuna and Dhadu under Section 323 IPC because P.W.1’s consistent account of the assault with lathis was substantially corroborated by the medical evidence of simple injuries.

The non-examination of the Investigating Officer did not cause prejudice, as his death explained his absence and the alleged contradictions were neither material nor sufficient to discredit the prosecution witnesses.

Finally, considering that the occurrence was nearly three decades old, the appeal had remained pending for over twenty-three years, there was no material showing subsequent criminal antecedents, and the surviving offences were under Sections 324 and 323 IPC, the Court considered probation appropriate.

Keshaba’s conviction was altered from Section 307 IPC to Section 324 IPC.

The convictions of Arjuna and Dhadu under Section 323 IPC were affirmed.

Instead of requiring the appellants to undergo the substantive sentences, the Court extended the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for one year, subject to each appellant executing a bond of ₹5,000 with one surety for the like amount, maintaining peace and good behaviour, appearing to receive sentence if called upon, and remaining under the supervision of the Probation Officer.

Each appellant was also directed under Section 5 of the Act to pay ₹5,000 compensation to P.W.1 and P.W.2 within four weeks.