Mere utterance of “go and die,” without proximate mens rea, does not constitute abetment of suicide.

Ansuyaben, married to accused No.1 for approximately four years, died from burn injuries after allegedly pouring kerosene on herself and setting herself ablaze on 22 March 2006.

The prosecution alleged that accused No.1—her husband—and accused Nos.2 and 3—her father-in-law and mother-in-law—subjected her to mental and physical cruelty, demanded money, and that accused Nos.2 and 3 instigated accused No.1.

She was treated in hospital for 10–12 days and died on 5 April 2006; the post-mortem attributed death to septicemic shock caused by extensive burns.

A dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, and a complaint was also relied upon as a dying declaration.

The Trial Court acquitted all accused of offences under Sections 306, 498-A and 114 of the IPC.

During the pendency of the appeal, accused No.1 died by suicide and the proceedings against him abated; the appeal therefore concerned accused Nos.2 and 3.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused Nos.2 and 3 subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment punishable under Section 498-A IPC.

Whether accused Nos.2 and 3 abetted the deceased’s suicide within the meaning of Sections 107 and 306 IPC.

Whether the Trial Court’s order of acquittal disclosed perversity, manifest illegality, or misappreciation of evidence warranting appellate interference.

The Court applied Sections 306, 498-A, 107 and 114 of the IPC, requiring proof of abetment, instigation, or intentional aid and legally cognisable cruelty or harassment.

It considered the presumptions under Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act but held that foundational facts, including cruelty and abetment, still had to be established.

Under Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710, a dying declaration is not inadmissible merely because it lacks a doctor’s certification regarding the declarant’s mental fitness.

Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2023 SC 4129, requires assessment of a dying declaration in light of its voluntariness, consistency, timing, reliability and surrounding circumstances.

Following Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 5 SCC 371, the words “go and die,” without more, do not necessarily constitute instigation under Section 107 IPC.

In an appeal against acquittal, the principles in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, and subsequent decisions recognise the appellate power to reappreciate evidence but require due regard to the double presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, acquittal should not be disturbed.

The Court found that the principal evidence against accused Nos.2 and 3 consisted of general allegations by related witnesses, with material omissions and contradictions regarding the alleged cruelty, harassment, residence of the accused, and their participation in the incident.

The prosecution did not satisfactorily establish that accused Nos.2 and 3 lived with the deceased or subjected her to mental or physical cruelty.

Defence evidence indicated that they resided separately, were away at the agricultural field when the incident occurred, and thereafter helped transport the deceased to hospital.

The dying declaration established that the deceased herself poured kerosene and ignited the fire, but the Court held that the allegation that she had been told to “go and die” did not, in the circumstances, prove the requisite mens rea or proximate instigation under Section 107 IPC.

Since the prosecution failed to prove the foundational facts of cruelty or abetment, the presumptions under Sections 113-A and 113-B could not justify conviction.

Applying the heightened restraint applicable to an appeal against acquittal, the Court held that the Trial Court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor legally infirm.

It held that accused Nos.2 and 3 were not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have committed cruelty under Section 498-A IPC or abetted the deceased’s suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Finding no manifest illegality or perversity in the Trial Court’s acquittal, the High Court dismissed the State’s appeal and confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal.

The bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the Trial Court.