MHADA Executive Engineer can initiate summary eviction of tenants obstructing redevelopment, Bombay High Court rules

The petitioners, tenants or occupants of Issa Building, challenged proceedings under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (“MHADA Act”) relating to redevelopment under Regulation 33(7) of the DCPR 2034.

They contended that the Executive Engineer lacked authority to initiate those proceedings and that the developers had not complied with conditions in the NOC, including requirements concerning permanent alternate accommodation agreements (PAAAs), area entitlement, corpus and a bank guarantee or fixed deposit.

The respondents maintained that the Executive Engineer had been authorised by the Board’s Chief Officer, and that the relevant NOC conditions had been complied with, offered, or were due at a later stage.

The petitions were heard together as they raised common issues.

Whether the proceedings initiated by the Executive Engineer under Section 95A were without jurisdiction or contrary to the MHADA Act.

Whether the alleged non-compliance with NOC conditions made the Section 95A proceedings premature or unlawful.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides a summary eviction mechanism where the statutory prerequisites for redevelopment are met, including the required occupier consent and an NOC, and requires the NOC holder to provide temporary accommodation or rent in lieu.

Sections 16 and 18 establish an administrative framework in which the Board performs its functions through its officers, including its Chief Officer; Section 181 concerns delegation of powers or functions of the Authority and does not require each Board function to be performed by a fresh Board resolution.

The principle *delegatus non potest delegare* applies subject to contrary indications in the statute’s language, scope or object.

The Court relied on *Radhika George v. MHADA* regarding the summary character and limited scope of Section 95A proceedings, *Sayed Anwar Gafoor v. Administrator and Divisional Commissioner* regarding the statutory role of authorised officers, and *Vasant Kheraj Bhanushali v. Goregaon Siddharth Nagar Sahakari Grih Nirman Sanstha Ltd.* concerning the binding effect of redevelopment consent.

It distinguished *Sahni Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation* and *Javed Abdul Rahim Attar v. MHADA* on their statutory and factual contexts.

The Court held that the Board’s statutory functions could be carried out through its administrative structure and that the Chief Officer, recognised under Sections 16 and 18, had authorised the Executive Engineer to act under Section 95A.

The Executive Engineer’s action was therefore authorised, rather than an independent assumption of jurisdiction; the relevant administrative orders were not challenged.

Section 181 did not alter that conclusion because the case did not involve delegation of the Authority’s powers.

On the NOC issue, the Court accepted the authorities’ evidence that the conditions operated at different stages and that the matters raised had been complied with, offered but not accepted, or were not yet due—for example, the 10% rehabilitation construction-cost deposit was due before demolition, which had not commenced.

It also accepted the developers’ undertaking to provide transit rent and corpus and to register PAAAs, and the Advocate General’s statement that the authorities would act on any established breach.

It dismissed all the writ petitions, discharged the rule and made no order as to costs.

It expected the authorities to ensure compliance with the NOC conditions and to take action in the event of breach.