MHADA Executive Engineer can initiate summary eviction proceedings to facilitate approved redevelopment, Bombay High Court rules

The petitioners were tenants or occupants of Issa Building, a dilapidated building in Mumbai undergoing redevelopment under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control Regulations, 2034.

The owners had obtained permissions, and approximately 57 of the building’s 83 tenants had surrendered possession and executed Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs).

The petitioners challenged eviction proceedings initiated under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA Act), including notices dated 12 August 2026.

They contended that the proceedings were premature because specified conditions in the redevelopment NOC—including execution of PAAAs, provision of transit rent and corpus, and a bank guarantee or fixed deposit—had not been fulfilled.

They also argued that the Executive Engineer who initiated the proceedings lacked jurisdiction.

The respondents maintained that the Executive Engineer had been authorized to act and that the relevant NOC conditions either had been met, had been offered, or were due at a later stage.

1. Whether the proceedings under Section 95A initiated by the Executive Engineer were without jurisdiction under the MHADA Act.

2. Whether alleged non-compliance with NOC conditions rendered the Section 95A proceedings premature or illegal.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides a summary mechanism for eviction of occupants in specified redevelopment circumstances, once its statutory prerequisites are met; it is not intended to resolve every dispute about redevelopment through a full trial.

Sections 2(3), 2(6), 16 and 18 establish the Authority, Boards and their officers as part of the Act’s administrative structure, with the Chief Officer recognised as an officer of the Board and an authority charged with carrying out the Act.

Section 181 concerns delegation of powers and functions of the Authority; it does not displace the Board’s administrative structure or require each executive act to be separately resolved by the Board.

The principle delegatus non potest delegare may be displaced by contrary indications in the statute’s language, scope or object.

The Court also applied Radhika George v. MHADA, which held that Section 95A proceedings are not a forum for civil or co-operative disputes; Sayed Anwar Gafoor v. Administrator and Divisional Commissioner, which rejected a similar hyper-technical objection to action by authorised MHADA officers; and Vasant Kheraj Bhanushali v. Goregaon Siddharth Nagar Sahakari Grih Nirman Sanstha Ltd., concerning the binding effect of consent to redevelopment.

The Court held that the Executive Engineer had not assumed jurisdiction unilaterally: a 2022 administrative order directed that Section 95A actions be executed by that officer, and the Chief Officer specifically authorized the action in this case by an order dated 1 July 2026.

Those orders were not challenged, and the Court considered the officer’s role consistent with the statutory administrative structure.

On the NOC objections, the Court accepted the authorities’ evidence that relevant obligations operated at different stages: transit rent and corpus had been offered and deposited with MHADA after the petitioners did not accept them; the 10% construction-cost deposit was due before demolition, which had not commenced; and the PAAAs were required before a later application for a further NOC and plinth-level commencement certificate.

The Court found no present breach warranting suspension of the eviction proceedings, accepted the owners’ undertaking to provide transit rent and corpus and register PAAAs on the applicable terms, and noted the authorities’ assurance that established non-compliance would be addressed in accordance with law.

It found no jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice or illegality warranting intervention under Article 226, and held that the Section 95A proceedings were within the framework of the MHADA Act.

All writ petitions were dismissed, the rule was discharged, and there was no order as to costs; the Court expected the authorities to ensure compliance with the NOC conditions and act upon any breach.