Migration Based on Merit Is Continuation of Service, Ensuring Continuity, Seniority, and Pay Protection.

The appellants were candidates for the post of Primary Teacher in the School Education and Tribal Development Departments. Despite higher merit, they were excluded from the School Education Department and initially appointed to the Tribal Development Department

Following a successful writ petition and a revised merit list, they were allotted to the School Education Department

However, the respondents required them to resign from the Tribal Department to join the new post, treating them as "fresh appointees" with a 70% salary reduction and loss of seniority

The learned Single Judge dismissed their challenge, holding they were estopped from claiming past service benefits as they had submitted resignations without challenging the underlying conditions of the transfer order

1. Whether the movement of an employee from one government department to another based on higher merit and judicial intervention constitutes a "fresh appointment" or a "migration in continuation of service"

2. Whether a technical resignation submitted solely to comply with administrative procedures for departmental transfer results in the forfeiture of past service, seniority, and pay protection

The Court applied the principles of continuity of service and pay protection under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which protects emoluments as a form of property

It relied on the precedent set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Praveen Kumar Kurmi v. State of M.P. & Others

the Coordinate Bench decision in Roopendra Chadar & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (W.P. No. 34360/2024), which established that migration between departments due to merit rectification does not sever the employer-employee relationship nor forfeit past service benefits

The Court further applied the doctrine that technical/procedural resignations do not constitute voluntary abandonment of service

The Court reasoned that the appellants' appointment to the School Education Department was not a new selection process but a rectification of the State's initial illegality in denying them merit-based posts

Since the movement was necessitated by judicial direction to honor higher merit, it must be classified as "migration in continuation of service" rather than "fresh recruitment"

The Court rejected the State's plea of estoppel, clarifying that the resignations were not voluntary acts to join a different establishment but were compelled procedural formalities imposed by the respondents to facilitate the transfer

Consequently, resetting the probation period and reducing salary from 90% to 70% was deemed arbitrary and a violation of Articles 14 and 16, as there was no statutory provision allowing for the forfeiture of service under these specific circumstances

It held that the appellants are entitled to treat their service in the School Education Department as a continuation of their prior service in the Tribal Development Department

The Court directed the respondents to provide full consequential benefits, including seniority, pay protection, and counting of the past service/probation period

The respondents were specifically ordered to restore the appellants' pay to the levels drawn prior to migration and release all arrears within ninety days