Minor discrepancies regarding the incident’s location do not discredit consistent victim testimony corroborated by medical evidence.

The applicant was prosecuted along with co-accused persons for offences under Sections 354 and 323/34 of the Indian Penal Code arising from an allegation that, after calling the prosecutrix and her friend to a resort for a dance programme, he and the co-accused dragged the prosecutrix towards a room, assaulted her, and also assaulted her friend when she intervened.

The prosecutrix lodged the FIR, following which a charge-sheet was filed.

The Trial Court examined five prosecution witnesses and convicted the applicant under Sections 354 and 323 IPC, sentencing him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹500 under Section 354 IPC, and fines of ₹500 each under Section 323 IPC, with default imprisonment.

The Appellate Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The applicant therefore invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, contending that the prosecution evidence was unreliable due to the absence of independent witnesses and contradictions concerning the place of occurrence.

Whether the concurrent findings of conviction under Sections 354 and 323 IPC were sustainable on the testimony of the prosecutrix, her friend, and the medical evidence, despite the absence of other independent eyewitnesses?

Whether the discrepancy between the prosecutrix’s and her friend’s descriptions of the name of the resort rendered their testimony unreliable?

Whether the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, ought to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court?

The Court applied Sections 354 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code: Section 354 criminalises assault or criminal force against a woman with intent to outrage, or knowledge that such conduct is likely to outrage, her modesty, while Section 323 penalises voluntarily causing hurt.

The Court also applied the principles governing appreciation of the testimony of an injured victim and an eyewitness, holding that such testimony cannot be discarded merely because the witness is known to the victim or because there is no independent corroboration, particularly where it remains substantially unshaken in cross-examination and receives medical support.

In revisional jurisdiction, interference with concurrent findings is warranted only where the findings are perverse, illegal, or unsupported by evidence; mere reappreciation of evidence or minor discrepancies does not justify interference.

The Court found that the prosecutrix clearly deposed that the applicant and the co-accused caught hold of her, dragged her towards a room, and assaulted her, and that her account was supported by her friend, PW-3.

The fact that PW-1 and PW-3 were friends did not make their testimony inherently unreliable, particularly since the allegation of molestation was not effectively discredited in cross-examination.

The medical evidence of PW-4, who found swelling and abrasions on the prosecutrix’s cheeks and neck, corroborated the allegation of assault.

The discrepancy regarding the name of the resort was treated as a minor inconsistency attributable to possible confusion about the place’s name and was not considered sufficient to discard the otherwise consistent account of the occurrence.

Since both courts below had reached concurrent findings based on the victim’s testimony, corroborative eyewitness evidence, and medical evidence, the High Court found no perversity or legal infirmity warranting revisional interference.

It held that the evidence sufficiently established the applicant’s guilt for molesting and assaulting the prosecutrix under Sections 354 and 323 IPC, and that the minor discrepancy concerning the resort did not undermine the prosecution case.

The criminal revision was dismissed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court were upheld.

Pending interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of, with no order as to costs.