Minor inconsistencies do not discredit credible eyewitness testimony corroborated by medical evidence.

The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for stabbing Anil alias Mathur Baraik.

The prosecution relied principally on PW-3, a neighbour who said she witnessed the stabbing, and on medical evidence, a village salishinama, and recovery of the weapon.

The appellant challenged the conviction, disputing PW-3’s credibility and the investigation, including the delay in transmission of the FIR and the weapon recovery.

The appeal was dismissed after the High Court reappraised the evidence.

1. Whether the delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, and the alleged irregularities in its preparation, undermined the prosecution case.

2. Whether PW-3’s testimony was reliable despite the challenges to her eyesight, opportunity to observe, delayed reporting, and alleged inconsistencies with her prior statement.

3. Whether the admissible evidence, including the weapon recovery, medical evidence, and motive, proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Section 302 IPC.

Section 157 CrPC requires the FIR to be sent to the Magistrate forthwith, but delay alone does not invalidate a prosecution absent circumstances indicating manipulation or prejudice (Pala Singh v. State of Punjab).

A witness’s evidence must be assessed as a whole; minor discrepancies and variations in human recollection do not warrant rejection unless they undermine credibility (Leela Ram v. State of Haryana; Shahaja v. State of Maharashtra).

Under Sections 145 of the Evidence Act and 162 CrPC, a prior statement intended to contradict a witness must be put to the witness in the prescribed manner; a Section 164 CrPC statement is not substantive evidence and may be used for corroboration or contradiction.

Section 27 of the Evidence Act admits only that part of information given in custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered.

Under Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab and Dhupa Chamar v. State of Bihar, an intentional injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death may constitute murder under Section 302 IPC.

Section 8 of the Evidence Act makes relevant conduct connected with a fact in issue, including absconding, though absconding alone does not establish guilt.

The Court found that the FIR was registered promptly and that the two-day interval before its receipt by the Magistrate, without demonstrated prejudice or evidence of manipulation, did not discredit the prosecution.

It accepted PW-3 as a credible eyewitness: she lived near the scene, described the occurrence consistently on its essential features, and explained why she waited until morning to report it; the defence had not properly confronted her with the alleged omissions in her Section 164 statement.

The discrepancies concerning time, injuries, and witness recollection were not material when considered against the consistent ocular and medical evidence.

The Court confined reliance on the accused’s police statement to the information distinctly leading to discovery of the weapon, and noted that recovery was also supported by an independent witness.

The eyewitness account, medical evidence, and evidence of prior enmity established that the appellant intentionally inflicted a fatal knife injury; the Court therefore found no basis to reduce the offence to Section 304 IPC.

The appeal was dismissed; bail was cancelled, the appellant was directed to surrender and be taken into custody, and the stay on realization of the fine was vacated.

The period of detention was directed to be set off in accordance with Section 428 CrPC.