Minor procedural irregularities do not vitiate a disciplinary inquiry absent material prejudice to the employee.

The petitioner, employed as a Clerk-cum-Translator at the respondent school from 3 August 1992, challenged her termination with immediate effect on 27 September 2003.

The management had conducted a disciplinary inquiry into nine charges, including negligence, unauthorised absence, embezzlement, insubordination, threats and physical assault.

The School Tribunal dismissed her appeal on 29 January 2008, finding that she had received a fair opportunity to participate in the inquiry and defend herself.

The petitioner then invoked Articles 226 and 227, alleging procedural breaches and challenging the Tribunal’s findings.

During the writ proceedings, she also placed on record her acquittal in a criminal case under IPC Sections 499, 500 and 506.

1. Whether alleged procedural irregularities in the disciplinary inquiry—including breaches concerning permission, suspension, pre-inquiry procedure and cross-examination—caused material prejudice warranting interference with the Tribunal’s decision

2. Whether the petitioner’s acquittal under IPC Sections 499, 500 and 506 materially affected the disciplinary findings on the broader set of charges

3. Whether the Tribunal’s decision disclosed perversity or another basis for writ-court interference

The Court applied the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and the Rules, 1981, including Rules 33, 35, 36 and 37, in considering the petitioner’s objections to the inquiry procedure.

It held that procedural irregularities do not vitiate an inquiry unless they cause material and real prejudice to the employee.

Relying on Indra Bhanu Gaur v. Committee of Management of M.M. Degree College, (2004) 1 SCC 281, the Court stated that a person who does not avail opportunities provided in the inquiry cannot ordinarily complain of their denial.

In exercising review under Articles 226 and 227, the Court would not reappreciate evidence merely to substitute its view for a probable view reached by the Tribunal.

The Court found that the petitioner and her nominee attended the inquiry proceedings, that the petitioner questioned witnesses, and that she received the inquiry records and sufficient opportunity to defend herself; she also chose not to lead evidence.

The Tribunal had accepted the explanation for the absence of a key witness, Mr. Dominic Xavier, and other witnesses—including the Principal and school employees—were examined and cross-examined.

The alleged breaches of Rules 33(1) and 35(1) had not been specifically raised before the Tribunal, and the management had therefore lacked an opportunity to address them; in the circumstances, the Court found no resulting prejudice sufficient to invalidate the inquiry.

The later acquittal concerned defamation and criminal intimidation, whereas the disciplinary inquiry covered nine distinct charges, so the acquittal did not materially affect the inquiry outcome.

The Court also found no perversity in the Tribunal’s assessment warranting writ interference.

The writ petition was dismissed, the Rule discharged, and no order as to costs was made; the pending interim application was also disposed of.