### MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE FOR GANG RAPE TO TWENTY YEARS RI BALANCING PROPORTIONALITY WITH REFORMATIVE POTENTIAL

The appellant, Ehsaan, was convicted under Section 376-D of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the gang rape of a victim (PW-2).

The victim had boarded a rickshaw driven by the appellant, who, instead of dropping her home, took her to a deserted location where a co-accused joined him in committing the offence.

The Trial Court sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, a decision affirmed by the Delhi High Court.

While the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the conviction, it issued notice limited to the quantum of sentence.

1. Whether the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life satisfies the doctrine of proportionality in light of the appellant’s age and lack of criminal antecedents.

The court applied the "Doctrine of Proportionality" as interpreted in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, asserting that a sentence must be proportionate to the offence to satisfy Articles 14, 19, and 21.

It relied on Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh) regarding the balance between the gravity of the offence and rehabilitative justice.

The court also noted the statutory mandate of Section 376-D IPC (as amended by Act 13 of 2013), which prescribes a minimum sentence of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.

The Court balanced the "heinous" nature of the gang rape against mitigating factors unique to the appellant. It observed that the appellant was 25 years old at the time of the offence, had no prior criminal record, and had maintained good conduct during nearly ten years of incarceration.

While acknowledging that the 2013 Amendment removed judicial discretion to award less than the minimum 20-year sentence, the Court noted that the "remainder of natural life" is the maximum possible penalty. The Court reasoned that given the possibility of reformation and the state's failure to prove otherwise, a life sentence spanning the entire natural life was disproportionate.

It emphasized that the gravity of the crime against the society and the legislative intent behind the post-Nirbhaya amendments necessitated a stern, albeit tempered, punishment.

The Court further directed that the appellant shall be entitled to the benefit of remission, if any.