MP HC Leaves POCSO Acquittal In Place After Friend Testified Accused Commented On Her, Not The Minor

In brief

The question

1. Whether the State should be granted leave to appeal against the respondent’s acquittal under Sections 354-A and 354-D IPC and Sections 10 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

The court held

The Court held that the acquittal did not disclose an infirmity justifying leave to appeal or interference.

It also directed

It dismissed the State’s petition as not worthy of acceptance.

01Facts

The State sought leave to appeal under Section 378(III) read with Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the respondent’s acquittal of offences under Sections 354-A and 354-D of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 10 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

¶ 1

The prosecution alleged that the respondent harassed the minor victim while she attended coaching classes and, on the incident date, caught her hand with bad intention.

¶ 2

The victim’s friend, Monika Sharma (PW-2), said the respondent had made comments about her, not the victim.

¶ 4

The High Court also noted prior enmity between the families and that the FIR was lodged two days after the incident.

¶ 4

The trial court had acquitted the respondent, finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

¶ 4

02Issues

i.1. Whether the State should be granted leave to appeal against the respondent’s acquittal under Sections 354-A and 354-D IPC and Sections 10 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

¶ 1–2

ii.2. Whether the trial court’s acquittal was so perverse, illegal, or unsustainable as to justify appellate interference.

¶ 11–14

03Law Applied

Section 378(III) read with Section 378(1) CrPC governs the State’s application for leave to appeal against acquittal.

¶ 1

The Court relied on Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225, for the principle that an appellate court should first determine whether the acquittal is palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, or demonstrably unsustainable before reappraising the evidence.

¶ 11

It also applied the principles in Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110, and Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B., (2023) 6 SCC 605: an accused’s presumption of innocence is reinforced by acquittal, and where two reasonable views are possible, the view favouring the accused should prevail; interference is warranted only where the acquittal is perverse or illegal.

¶ 12–13

Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Section 10 Section 12

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 378

04Reasoning

The High Court found material inconsistency between the victim’s account and PW-2’s evidence regarding whom the respondent had allegedly targeted. It also considered the family enmity and the two-day delay in lodging the FIR, in the context of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.

¶ 4

Applying the principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court concluded that the trial court had properly evaluated the evidence and that its decision to extend the benefit of doubt disclosed no illegality or perversity warranting appellate intervention.

¶ 14–15