01Facts
The plaintiff-landlord sued to evict the defendant-tenant, alleging that the tenanted premises were old, dilapidated and unsafe, and required removal and reconstruction; the plaint also pleaded bona fide need.
¶ 3, 16The trial court dismissed the suit. In the first appeal, the appellate court remanded the matter, holding that the pleadings raised a ground under Section 12(1)(h), rather than Section 12(1)(g), of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
¶ 5After remand, the trial court again dismissed the suit, but the appellate court granted eviction under Section 12(1)(g).
¶ 6The tenant appealed under Section 100 CPC. The High Court admitted the appeal on questions concerning the effect of the earlier remand order and whether the appellate court could later grant eviction under clause (g).
¶ 702Issues
i.Whether the first appellate court could, in the subsequent appeal, grant eviction under Section 12(1)(g) contrary to its earlier remand order identifying Section 12(1)(h) as the applicable ground?
¶ 7ii.Whether the earlier remand order operated as res judicata in the subsequent first appeal, and whether its correctness could be examined in the second appeal?
¶ 7, 19–2003Law Applied
Section 12(1)(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 permits eviction where the accommodation has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and is bona fide required for repairs that cannot be carried out without it being vacated; Section 12(1)(h) concerns bona fide requirements for building, rebuilding, or substantial additions or alterations that cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated, and attracts the requirements of Section 12(7).
¶ 13–15A determination made at an earlier stage of the same litigation generally binds the court at a later stage, subject to the higher court’s power to examine the correctness of an interlocutory determination when reviewing the final decree; the Court relied on Smt. Deorajin Debi v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941.
¶ 19–20The Court also referred to Order 41 Rule 33 CPC as empowering it to examine the correctness of the remand order.
¶ 20Under Section 100 CPC, factual findings are not ordinarily open to interference absent a substantial question of law.
¶ 21–22Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100
04Reasoning
The remand order had classified the plaint’s allegations as raising clause (h), so the first appellate court was bound by that determination when deciding the later appeal and could not depart from it.
¶ 18However, the remand order’s correctness remained examinable in the second appeal. On examining the plaint, the High Court concluded that its allegations—that the premises were unsafe and unfit, and required removal for repairs—fell under clause (g), not clause (h).
¶ 16–17, 19–20, 24The appellate court’s finding that the premises were dilapidated and unsafe was a factual finding not shown to be open to interference under Section 100 CPC; the Court also noted that the tenant had been given a right of re-entry under Section 18 of the Act.
¶ 21–2205Holding
The High Court held that the first appellate court could not contradict the remand order in the subsequent first appeal, and that the remand order operated as res judicata at that stage.
¶ 23–24Nevertheless, the High Court could examine the remand order in the second appeal and found its classification of the pleadings under Section 12(1)(h) erroneous; the pleadings instead attracted Section 12(1)(g).
¶ 23–24The second appeal was dismissed, and the eviction judgment and decree dated 1 August 2012 were upheld.
¶ 24Original Court PDF
Central Cycle Store Th: Proprietor Vipin GargvsSmt. Ratan Jain (Deleted) Subhash Jain
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