MP High Court upholds Ujjain mosque’s partial demolition for 15-metre road widening ahead of Simhastha 2028

The petitioners claimed an interest in and administered the Shahi Masjid at Municipal No. 524, Khasra No. 2072, Chatri Chowk, Ujjain, which was stated to be a registered Waqf property and an ancient religious structure.

The Municipal Corporation issued notices dated 14.08.2026, 25.08.2026, 27.08.2026 and a final notice/order dated 01.09.2026 proposing removal of the portion of the mosque falling within the proposed 15-metre road-widening line.

The petitioners challenged the action as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 25, 26 and 300A of the Constitution.

The Corporation contended that the action was undertaken pursuant to the Ujjain Development Plan, 2035, in larger public interest, particularly for traffic management during Shahi Sawari, Peshwai and Simhastha 2028.

Whether the Municipal Corporation’s notices and proposed removal of the obstructing portion of the mosque for implementation of the 15-metre road-widening plan were arbitrary, unconstitutional or violative of Articles 14, 25, 26 and 300A of the Constitution?

Whether the Corporation was required to initiate proceedings under Sections 322 and 323 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, rather than proceeding under Section 305?

Whether the action was invalid for failure to issue a separate notice to the Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board and for alleged non-compliance with procedural safeguards, including demarcation, hearing and a reasoned decision?

Whether the petitioners’ objections regarding alternative routes and differential treatment of neighbouring religious or historical structures justified interference under Article 226 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Section 305 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, under which a portion of a building projecting beyond the regular line of a public street may be required to be removed or set back, with the added portion vesting in the Corporation and reasonable compensation being payable for resulting loss.

Sections 322 and 323, concerning obstructions in streets and unauthorised interference with streets or Corporation property, were distinguished from the road-line regulation contemplated by Section 305.

Under In Re Manoj Tiberwal Akash, authorities undertaking road widening must ascertain the existing road width, conduct survey and demarcation, issue written notice, decide objections by a speaking order, provide reasonable further notice and acquire land according to law where existing public land is insufficient.

Article 25 protects religious practice but does not confer an absolute right to worship at or preserve a particular parcel of land; acquisition or removal of a religious structure may be permissible where justified by law and public interest, as recognised in Mohammad Ali Khan v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.

Gulam Kadar Ahmadbhai Menon v. Surat Municipal Corporation holds that religious places are not wholly immune from acquisition, although places having particular religious significance require heightened consideration and ordinary religious structures should be interfered with only in unusual or extraordinary circumstances; public authorities must balance religious interests with municipal requirements.

The Court also relied on Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal Corporation, which recognises the binding effect of a duly prepared development plan and the Corporation’s authority to implement a regular street line without necessarily resorting to ordinary land-acquisition proceedings.

Articles 14, 25, 26 and 300A therefore had to be read subject to lawful town planning, public safety, public order and reasonable compensation.

The Court found that the proposed road widening was undertaken pursuant to the Ujjain Development Plan, 2035, and served a substantial public purpose involving traffic management and public safety, particularly in view of the expected Simhastha 2028 gathering.

The Corporation had not targeted the mosque selectively: it stated that approximately 80 religious structures had been dealt with across Ujjain, including 10 temples and one mosque on the same road. This weakened the allegation of discrimination under Article 14.

The Court further accepted that the petitioners or their office-bearers had received notices, filed objections and were heard before the impugned order was passed; therefore, the procedural safeguards identified in Manoj Tiberwal Akash were treated as substantially satisfied.

The Court held that the action concerned removal of the portion obstructing the regular line of the public street and therefore fell within Section 305, rather than Sections 322 or 323.

Section 305 permitted vesting of the affected strip in the Corporation and did not require separate land-acquisition proceedings merely because the property was privately owned or religious.

The religious character of the property did not create absolute immunity under Articles 25 or 26.

The Court concluded that removal of only a limited obstructing portion, while preserving the remaining mosque and offering FAR/TDR compensation, did not extinguish the right to practise Islam.

The suggested alternatives involving a nearby garden or opposite commercial property were found factually unsuitable and insufficient to displace the Corporation’s planning decision.

The disputed questions concerning the petitioners’ authority and locus also militated against granting discretionary relief under Article 226.

It held that the Corporation’s action under Section 305 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, for removal of the mosque’s obstructing portion pursuant to the Ujjain Development Plan, 2035, was lawful, non-discriminatory and consistent with Articles 14, 25, 26 and 300A.

The Court found that adequate notice and hearing had been provided, that separate proceedings under Sections 322 and 323 were unnecessary, and that the religious character of the property did not bar road widening undertaken for a legitimate public purpose.

Both writ petitions were accordingly dismissed, and no interference was made under Article 226 of the Constitution.