MTS service cannot be equated with Havaldar service solely due to identical grade pay for promotion eligibility.

The applicant, a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) under the Central GST/Excise Department, initially joined as a daily wager in 1981, was appointed as temporary staff in 1993, and was appointed as Chaukidar in 1999. He was later redesignated as Multi Tasking Staff (MTS) and promoted to the post of LDC on 04.03.2015 from a combined list of Havaldars and MTS employees.

Under the Tax Assistant Recruitment Rules, 2014, promotion from LDC to Tax Assistant required eight years’ regular service in the LDC grade, failing which eight years’ combined service in the grades of LDC and Havaldar could be considered.

The applicant claimed that his earlier service as Chaukidar/MTS should be treated as equivalent to service as Havaldar because both posts carried Grade Pay of Rs. 1,800 and because he had been promoted from a combined list of Havaldars and MTS employees.

His juniors were promoted as Tax Assistants on 31.03.2017 and 22.03.2018, but his representations seeking promotion were rejected.

1. Whether the applicant’s service as Chaukidar/MTS could be treated as service in the grade of Havaldar for computing the qualifying service prescribed for promotion to Tax Assistant.

2. Whether the applicant was entitled to consideration for promotion under Note 1 to Column 11 merely because his juniors had been promoted, despite having completed only two years of regular service in the LDC grade.

3. Whether the applicant could claim promotion from the date of promotion of his juniors, with consequential benefits, on the basis of seniority and alleged violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The Tribunal applied Column 11 of the Tax Assistant Recruitment Rules, 2014, which prescribes eight years of regular service in the LDC grade, failing which eight years of combined regular service in the LDC and Havaldar grades, for promotion to Tax Assistant.

Note 1 permits a senior to be considered with juniors only where the senior is short of the prescribed qualifying service by not more than half of that service or two years, whichever is less, and has successfully completed probation.

Note 2 concerns computation of service in the corresponding revised pay structure after the Sixth Central Pay Commission; it does not create a new feeder grade or equate posts merely because they carry the same Grade Pay.

The Tribunal further applied the principle that identity of Grade Pay does not establish statutory equivalence of posts.

The distinction between a right to be considered for promotion and a right to promotion, as reiterated in Government of West Bengal v. Dr. Amal Satpathi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3512.

The principle in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284, and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2025) 2 SCC 1, that eligibility is ordinarily governed by the Recruitment Rules applicable when the recruitment or promotion process commenced.

Articles 14 and 16 do not require unequals to be treated equally, and seniority alone does not confer an indefeasible right to promotion.

The Tribunal held that the Recruitment Rules expressly identified only LDC and Havaldar as the grades whose service could be combined; Chaukidar/MTS was not included.

The applicant’s reliance on the common Grade Pay of Rs. 1,800 and his promotion from a combined Havaldar-MTS list was insufficient to establish legal equivalence, since equivalence had to arise from the statutory Rules and could not be inferred from pay structure or an administrative order applicable to promotion to another post.

Accordingly, his MTS service could not be counted as Havaldar service.

As he entered the LDC grade only on 04.03.2015, he had completed only two years of LDC service by 04.03.2017 and lacked the prescribed qualifying service in the recognized feeder grades.

Under Note 1, the maximum permissible deficiency was two years, because two years was less than half of the eight-year requirement; therefore, a senior needed at least six years of qualifying service to claim consideration with eligible juniors.

Completion of probation and passing the departmental examination could not cure the shortfall because the conditions of Note 1 were cumulative.

The promotion of juniors and the applicant’s higher seniority consequently did not create a right to promotion or establish discrimination, as the applicant was not similarly situated with respect to eligibility.

The Original Application was dismissed for want of merit, all pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.