Municipal authorities may independently act against unauthorized construction without a specific judicial direction.

The petitioner alleged wilful disobedience of the High Court’s order dated 6 October 2025 in W.P.(C) 15261/2025.

That order directed the MCD and DDA to conduct a joint inspection to determine whether the gated area between properties E-96 and E-97, Preet Vihar, was private property or public land, and, if it was public land, to take action in accordance with law after following due process.

Pursuant to the directions, the authorities conducted an inspection and found the vacant plot to be public land, with encroachments including an unauthorised RWA office, gates opening into the plot, ramps and other constructions.

The MCD reported that the unauthorised RWA office was demolished, the gates opening into the park were sealed, and ramps and thadas encroaching upon public land were removed.

It also initiated action against E-96 and E-97 for deviations, excess coverage and unauthorised openings towards the adjoining public land, passing demolition orders under Section 343 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The petitioner additionally sought removal of an electricity transformer, while the owner/applicant of E-96 and E-97 challenged the demolition of ramps and stated that an appeal was pending before the Appellate Tribunal, MCD.

Whether the respondents wilfully disobeyed the High Court’s order dated 6 October 2025 directing inspection of the disputed area and lawful action concerning any encroachment on public land.

Whether the Court could direct removal of the electricity transformer in contempt proceedings when its removal was not the subject matter of the original writ petition or the earlier directions.

Whether the MCD was entitled to remove ramps and take action against unauthorised construction at E-96 and E-97, notwithstanding that those constructions were not specifically the subject matter of the writ petition.

The Court applied the principles governing contempt jurisdiction, particularly that contempt requires wilful disobedience of a specific court direction and that the Court in contempt proceedings cannot enlarge or travel beyond the scope of the original order.

The original order required the MCD and DDA to conduct a joint inspection, determine the character of the disputed land, and take action against encroachments on public land in accordance with law and after following due process.

The Court further recognised the MCD’s independent statutory authority to act against deviations, excess coverage and unauthorised construction under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, including the power to pass demolition orders under Section 343, subject to due process.

No specific precedent was cited in the judgment.

The Court found that the essential directions in the earlier writ proceedings had been complied with: the MCD and DDA undertook a joint inspection, identified the disputed plot as public land, and removed the unauthorised RWA office, gates and encroachments.

Consequently, no basis remained for alleging wilful disobedience.

The request concerning the transformer was rejected as beyond the scope of the contempt proceedings because the earlier writ order contained no direction for its removal.

As regards E-96 and E-97, the Court held that the absence of a specific direction in the writ petition did not prevent the MCD from exercising its independent statutory powers against unauthorised construction or encroachment.

Since the ramps were allegedly constructed on public land, their removal fell within the MCD’s lawful authority, while the applicant’s pending appeal before the ATMCD was left to be decided on its own merits.

It declined to adjudicate the issue of removal of the electricity transformer, as that matter was outside the scope of the original directions.

The Court also upheld, in principle, the MCD’s authority to remove ramps encroaching on public land and to proceed independently against unauthorised construction, subject to statutory procedure and the applicant’s remedies before the ATMCD.

The contempt petition and the pending application were accordingly disposed of.