Music Composers Lack Rights to Exploit Sound Recordings Once Integrated Into Cinematograph Films Assigned to Producers

In brief

The question

1. Whether the assignment agreements executed by the original producers in favor of the Plaintiff were legally valid "concluded contracts" conferring ownership of sound recordings

The court held

The Court held that the Plaintiff is the prima facie owner of the sound recordings by virtue of assignment deeds from the producers

It also directed

The Court affirmed that Mr. Ilaiyaraaja’s rights are strictly limited to musical compositions and do not extend to sound recordings

The Court allowed I.A. 4116/2026, restraining Mr. Ilaiyaraaja from broadcasting the subject songs on online platforms, and made the ex-parte injunction in CS(COMM) 1310/2025 absolute, restraining the filmmakers from using the song "Naguva Nayana" without the Plaintiff’s license. All applications for vacation of injunctions were dismissed

01Facts

In CS(COMM) 143/2026, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant (Mr. Ilaiyaraaja, a renowned composer) unauthorizedly uploaded 134 films' sound recordings and musical works onto streaming platforms like Amazon Music and YouTube, claiming ownership

¶ 5.2-5.4

In CS(COMM) 1310/2025, the Plaintiff alleged that Black Madras Films unauthorizedly used the song "Naguva Nayana" (from the film Pallavi Anupallavi) as a background score in their film "Mask" based on a purported license from Mr. Ilaiyaraaja

¶ 42.2-42.3

Mr. Ilaiyaraaja challenged the Plaintiff's title, arguing that the assignment agreements from original producers were "contingent contracts" lacking the necessary written consent of authors and that as the composer, he retained rights over the musical works

¶ 6.8 / 6.14

02Issues

i.1. Whether the assignment agreements executed by the original producers in favor of the Plaintiff were legally valid "concluded contracts" conferring ownership of sound recordings

¶ 6.8 / 28

ii.2. Whether the composer (Mr. Ilaiyaraaja) holds copyright over the "sound recordings" incorporated within a cinematograph film

¶ 7.3 / 15

iii.3. Whether the Plaintiff’s suit was barred by limitation or acquiescence due to the Defendant’s long-standing presence on YouTube

¶ 6.5 / 8.8

03Law Applied

The Court primarily applied Section 2(f) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which defines "cinematograph film" to include sound recordings, and Section 2(d)(v), which designates the "producer" as the author of such film

¶ 14 / 48

Section 17(b) establishes that the producer is the first owner of the copyright in a cinematograph film unless an agreement to the contrary exists

¶ 7.4

The Court further relied on Section 13(4), which clarifies that copyright in a film/sound recording does not affect the separate copyright in the underlying musical work

¶ 17

Precedentially, the Court followed the Division Bench ruling in Mr. Ilaiyaraaja v. Saregama India Limited (2026:DHC:4556-DB), which held that a composer’s right is limited to the "musical work" (composition) and does not extend to the "sound recording" or "lyrics" once incorporated into a film

¶ 12 / 13

Provisions in the judgment · 13 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Section 2 Section 13 Section 14 Section 17 Section 18 Section 31 Section 33 Section 35 Section 51 Section 52 Section 55

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 151

Indian Contract Act, 1872 Section 31

04Reasoning

The Court reasoned that under the Copyright Act, a "sound recording" incorporated into a film becomes part of the "cinematograph film," making the producer the statutory owner of the recording

¶ 16

While Mr. Ilaiyaraaja, as the composer, remains the "author" of the musical composition under Section 2(p) and 13(4), this does not grant him rights to authorize the use of the actual sound recording or lyrics

¶ 15/47

Regarding the "contingent contract" argument, the Court observed that the clauses requiring producer-author consents were for the Plaintiff’s protection and did not invalidate the transfer of title, especially since the original producers had never challenged the Plaintiff's 30-year exploitation of these rights

¶ 31-32

On royalties, the Court found prima facie evidence from IPRS (Copyright Society) documents showing that the Defendant was receiving 25% "Composer" royalties while acknowledging the Plaintiff as "Owner," thereby negating the claim of non-payment and suggesting the Defendant’s knowledge of the Plaintiff’s rights

¶ 21-22