Mutually Agreed Seat of Arbitration Remains Static Unless Superseded by an Express Written Amendment

The petitioner and respondent entered into a written contract dated 17.10.2018 for gas compression facilities.

Clause 1.3.2(11) of the agreement specified that the "seat of arbitration shall be the place from where the LOA/NOA has been issued" (Ankleshwar), while allowing for another "venue" for convenience.

During the preliminary meeting on 07.10.2021, the Presiding Arbitrator’s minutes recorded that "the seat of Arbitration shall be at Ahmedabad" with the consent of the advocates.

The final award was rendered in Ahmedabad.

ONGC challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, at the Commercial Court, Ankleshwar.

The petitioner raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the "seat" had shifted to Ahmedabad, thus ousting Ankleshwar’s jurisdiction.

The Commercial Court rejected this objection on 18.03.2026, leading to this SCA.

1. Whether the "seat" of arbitration remains static at Ankleshwar as per the written contract, or shifted to Ahmedabad due to the Arbitrator’s minutes and the conduct of proceedings.

2. Whether an interlocutory order on jurisdiction by a Commercial Court is challengeable under Article 227 of the Constitution despite the bar in Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The court applied Section 2(1)(e)(i) and Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, distinguishing between "juridical seat" (Sections 20(1) and 20(2)) and "venue" (Section 20(3)).

Constitution Bench in BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium.

BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd. (establishing that a designated seat is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause).

BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions (holding that the seat remains static for certainty).

Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act regarding the maintainability of petitions against interlocutory orders.

Section 4 of the Arbitration Act regarding waiver.

The Court first held the petition maintainable under Article 227, ruling that the power of superintendence cannot be fully circumscribed by Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act when a fundamental jurisdictional issue is involved.

The Court analyzed Clause 1.3.2(11) alongside Clause 1.2.6, which required any contract amendment to be in writing and signed by authorized representatives.

The Court reasoned that the Arbitrator's minutes recording Ahmedabad as the "seat" did not constitute a formal amendment to the written contract.

Applying the test from BGS SGS SOMA, the Court found that since the original contract had a specific "seat" (Ankleshwar) and a clear "contrary indicia" (the requirement for written amendments and the distinction between seat and venue), the proceedings in Ahmedabad were merely meetings at a "venue" under Section 20(3).

The Court distinguished Inox Renewables Ltd., noting that in that case, the Arbitrator had specifically recorded a mutual agreement to shift the seat, whereas here, the mention was considered a "superfluous" use of the word "seat" for a convenient meeting place.

The Court held that for a jurisdictional seat to change, there must be express consent that is "clearly understood and agreed by the parties," which cannot be inferred from mere procedural minutes or conduct of hearings at a different venue.

The Commercial Court at Ankleshwar has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 application.