National Commission for Scheduled Castes lacks jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR but may only recommend investigation.

The petitioner, General Manager of a Bank, initiated recovery proceedings against Respondent No. 7 for defaulting on bank dues.

Respondent No. 7 filed a complaint with the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), alleging harassment "by different methods" due to his caste status.

On 11.01.2017, the NCSC issued an order directing the registration of an FIR against the petitioner.

The petitioner challenged this order under Article 226, arguing that the NCSC exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to provide an opportunity for a hearing.

Respondents contended that the order was merely a direction for investigation and caused no legal injury.

Whether the National Commission for Scheduled Castes has the jurisdiction to direct the registration of an FIR.

Whether a general allegation of harassment without specific instances of caste-based discrimination is sufficient to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction under Article 338.

The Court primarily applied Article 338 of the Constitution of India, which empowers the Commission to investigate and monitor matters relating to safeguards for Scheduled Castes and to inquire into specific complaints regarding the deprivation of rights.

The court emphasized that the Commission's jurisdiction is contingent upon a *prima facie* showing that a member was discriminated against solely based on social status.

Furthermore, the court applied the principle that the NCSC lacks the power to issue mandatory directions for the registration of an FIR, possessing only recommendatory powers.

The Court reasoned that for the NCSC to assume jurisdiction, there must be evidence that the action complained of was motivated by *mala fides* related to the complainant’s caste.

It noted that the respondent made only "specious" and "unsubstantiated" general allegations of harassment without citing specific instances of discrimination.

The Court observed that the petitioner’s actions were standard recovery proceedings against a defaulter, which do not inherently constitute a deprivation of rights based on class.

Applying the legal limits of Article 338, the Court found that the NCSC cannot be recognized as an authority to direct the police to register an FIR; its role is limited to making recommendations.

Thus, the "direction" issued by the Commission was interpreted by the Court strictly as a recommendation following legal procedure.

The Court clarified that the order dated 11.01.2017 does not mandate the registration of an FIR; instead, the police are at liberty to hold an inquiry as mandated under law based on the recommendation.

Consequently, the petition was disposed of with the clarification that no coercive direction for an FIR exists, effectively neutralizing the impugned mandatory direction while allowing for lawful inquiry.