Nativity preference in Village Assistant selection does not override higher comparative merit.

The appellant and the private respondents participated in the selection process for appointment as Village Assistant pursuant to the recruitment notification dated 25 January 2023.

The appellant contended that the fourth respondent, K. Murali, was not residing in Alangudi village, for which the post was advertised, but elsewhere within the Taluk.

The appellant challenged the selection before the High Court in W.P. No. 3020 of 2023. The writ petition was dismissed on 27 June 2023.

The selection marks recorded were 79 for the appellant and 87 for the fourth respondent.

1. Whether a candidate belonging to or residing in the village for which the Village Assistant post is advertised is entitled to exclusive consideration, with candidates from other villages within the Taluk being considered only when no candidate from the concerned village is available?

2. Whether the fourth respondent’s selection was invalid because he was not residing in Alangudi village, notwithstanding his higher aggregate marks?

3. Whether the selection had to be conducted solely under the recruitment notification, without applying the criteria and marks prescribed in G.O.Ms. No. 574 dated 17 October 2020?

The Court applied the Government guidelines issued under G.O.Ms. No. 574, dated 17 October 2020, which prescribe a structured, 100-mark selection process for Village Assistants, including marks for educational qualification, riding or driving skill, reading and writing ability, nativity, and interview.

Under the nativity criterion, a candidate born in the village for which recruitment is conducted receives 25 marks, while a candidate born within the Taluk receives 20 marks.

The Court held that the village-based preference is an award of additional marks and does not create an exclusive right to appointment for candidates from that village.

It further applied the constitutional principle of equal opportunity in public employment, holding that relative merit must be assessed among eligible candidates and that an additional preference cannot be converted into an absolute exclusion of more meritorious candidates from other villages within the Taluk.

The Court also acknowledged the general principle, relied upon by the appellant from Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, that the rules governing a selection process cannot ordinarily be changed after the process has commenced, but found no dispute regarding that principle in the present case.

The Court interpreted the village preference in the notification consistently with the Government’s marks-based selection scheme. Although a candidate from the concerned village receives higher nativity marks, the scheme does not mandate that such candidates must be appointed irrespective of their comparative performance.

The Court reasoned that accepting the appellant’s interpretation would enable a less-meritorious village candidate to be selected over a candidate from another village within the Taluk who had secured substantially higher marks, thereby neutralising the prescribed merit-based system and infringing the latter candidate’s right to equal consideration in public employment.

Applying this reasoning to the marks, the Court noted that the appellant secured 79 marks, whereas the fourth respondent secured 87 marks.

The appellant therefore could not claim appointment merely because he was from the same village, particularly when the prescribed nativity advantage had already been reflected in the marks awarded.

Since the fourth respondent secured higher aggregate marks than the appellant, his selection was not invalid merely because he was from another village within the Taluk.

Finding no infirmity in the order dated 27 June 2023 in W.P. No. 3020 of 2023, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal, imposed no costs, and closed the connected miscellaneous petition.