Nature of offence cannot be the sole criteria for rejecting or deferring remission applications.

Four life convicts filed writ petitions challenging the State Level Review Board’s decisions to defer or refuse their premature release under Section 432 of the CrPC (now Section 473 BNSS). All petitioners had served over 20 years in custody.

Ganesh Bhumij: Convicted of kidnapping and murder of a minor; release deferred by the Board for two years due to the "heinous nature" of the crime.

Samsul Miya: Convicted of murder; release deferred for two years based on heinousness, despite a co-accused receiving remission.

Md. Moynuddin: Convicted of murder; deferred because the Trial Court's opinion was "not clear".

Holiram Bordoloi: Sentenced to death (later commuted to life); now aged 75; deferred due to the heinous nature and perceived threat to society.

1. Whether the State Level Review Board can defer or reject a remission proposal solely based on the "heinous nature" of the crime.

2. Whether the Board is required to seek a fresh opinion from the Presiding Judge if the initial opinion provided under Section 432(2) CrPC is indecisive or fails to consider relevant factors.

3. Whether age (75+ years) and parity with co-accused are mandatory considerations under the State’s own Office Memorandum and existing precedents.

The court applied Section 432 of the CrPC regarding the power to remit sentences.

Section 433A CrPC which mandates a minimum 14-year actual servitude before remission.

Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, which established five factors for remission: (i) nature of the act, (ii) chance of recurrence, (iii) loss of potentiality to commit crime, (iv) purpose of further incarceration, and (v) socio-economic conditions.

Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh regarding the non-mechanical application of the Presiding Judge’s opinion.

Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand, which held that the heinousness of a crime cannot be the sole ground for denying remission.

State’s own Office Memorandum dated 06.10.2015.

The Court found that the Review Board failed to conduct a "holistic assessment" and instead relied on mechanical grounds.

For Ganesh Bhumij and Samsul Miya, the Board erred by using "heinous nature" as the exclusive reason for deferral, ignoring their excellent prison records and the principle of parity in Samsul’s case.

In Md. Moynuddin’s case, the Court held that since the Trial Court's opinion was indecisive, the Board was obligated to request a fresh, reasoned opinion rather than simply deferring the case.

For 75-year-old Holiram Bordoloi, the Board violated its own policy (OM dated 06.10.2015) by failing to obtain a Medical Board report to evaluate his physical potentiality to commit crime.

The Board’s Meeting on 19.03.2026 was criticized for considering proposals in a "wholesale manner" rather than the mandated "case-to-case" basis.

The Court ordered the Inspector General of Prisons to re-submit all four proposals to the Review Board by July 2026. The Court specifically directed that: (i) a fresh opinion be sought from the Presiding Judge for Md. Moynuddin, (ii) a Medical Board evaluation be conducted for Holiram Bordoloi, and (iii) all proposals be evaluated strictly against the Laxman Naskar factors and the 2015 Office Memorandum.