No Further Appeal Lies Against a Single Judge’s Order Passed in a Section 91 Trademark Appeal

The appellant was granted registration for a label mark "Ganraj Chhappan Bhog" on August 19, 2020

Respondent No. 2 filed for rectification and cancellation of the registration on December 5, 2020.

The Registrar (Respondent No. 1) allowed the rectification and cancelled the appellant's registration via order dated August 6, 2024

The appellant challenged this before the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The learned Single Judge dismissed that appeal on March 3, 2025

The appellant subsequently filed the present appeal before the Division Bench, which was contested on grounds of maintainability

1. Whether an appeal to the Division Bench is maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in an exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, in light of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which mandates that no further appeal lies from a judgment/order of a Single Judge of a High Court sitting in appeal, notwithstanding anything in the Letters Patent

The Supreme Court ruling in Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd., which established that once a quasi-judicial authority (like the CLB or Registrar) acts as an original authority, and a Single Judge hears an appeal against its order, Section 100A bars a second appeal

Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, regarding the statutory right of appeal to the High Court

The court reasoned that the prohibition under Section 100A of the CPC is absolute and overrides the Letters Patent of 1865

To trigger this bar, it is only necessary that a Single Judge of the High Court exercised "appeal powers" in relation to an original or appellate order

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the Registrar is not a "Court," holding that it is immaterial whether the subordinate authority is a civil court or a tribunal with the "trappings of a court"; the focus is solely on the High Court Judge's exercise of appellate jurisdiction

Furthermore, as the legislature substituted the "Appellate Board" with "High Court" in Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act in 2021—long after Section 100A CPC was in force—it is presumed the legislature was aware that such orders would be subject to the second-appeal bar

The court answered the framed issue by concluding that since the learned Single Judge had already exercised appellate powers under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the prohibition under Section 100A of the CPC operates to bar any further appeal to a Division Bench

The appeal (TEMPAPO-IPD 2 of 2025) was dismissed