Nomenclature of License Agreement prevails absent pleading and evidence of intent to create leasehold interest.

The plaintiff (respondent) owned a flat and executed a leave and license agreement with the defendant (appellant) on June 1, 2008, for a monthly fee of Rs. 4,500

The plaintiff alleged the defendant became irregular in payments and failed to vacate after the termination notice dated July 27, 2010

The City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, ordering vacant possession and payment of arrears

The defendant appealed, contending that the document was actually a lease agreement creating tenancy rights and that a subsequent oral agreement to sell the property had been reached

1. Whether the document at Exh. 66 is a license agreement or a lease agreement governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

2. Whether the license agreement was substituted by a subsequent agreement to sale under the principle of novation

3. Whether additional evidence in the form of a written agreement to sale can be admitted at the appellate stage under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC

Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, defining "licence," and Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defining "lease"

The Court relied on C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao, which establishes that the real intention of the parties, rather than labels like "rent" or "licence fee," determines the nature of the transaction

The court applied the restrictive principles of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC as interpreted in Gobind Singh v. Union of India, which prohibits the routine admission of additional evidence without foundational pleadings in the trial court

The Court found the defendant’s claim of a "lease" to be an afterthought because the written statement only made mention of a "license fee" and did not challenge the nature of the document during trial

Examining Exh. 66, the Court noted that Condition No. 11 (right of the licensor to enter) and Condition No. 14 (personal, non-heritable use) indicated a license, as the owner retained legal possession

Regarding novation, the Court observed a significant contradiction: the defendant had filed a separate suit (No. 2502/2013) claiming an oral agreement to sell, yet at the appellate stage, they sought to introduce a written agreement as "additional evidence"

The Court characterized this as a "complete bluff" and held that because there were no foundational pleadings for a written contract at the trial level, such evidence could not be admitted under Order 41 Rule 27

The Court dismissed the First Appeal, confirmed the trial court's judgment for eviction and arrears, and dismissed the applications for stay and additional evidence. The interim relief was vacated, and the record was ordered back to the lower court