Non-compliance with mandatory Section 4 publication requirements vitiates the entire land acquisition.

The petitioner purchased a 1,000-square-yard plot forming part of Khasra No. 90 at Village Roopwas, Tehsil Niwai, District Tonk, through a registered sale deed dated 16 February 1993, and subsequently constructed a residential house and shops on it.

The State issued a notification dated 15 September 1994 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”) for acquiring approximately 371.05 bighas for expansion of a RIICO industrial area.

The petitioner contended that the Section 4 notification was not properly published in newspapers circulating in the locality and that its substance was not affixed at convenient places.

A declaration under Section 6 was issued on 24 August 1995 and published in the Official Gazette on 31 August 1995. An award was subsequently made on 19 August 1996.

The Court found that possession of the petitioner’s land in Khasra No. 90 had not been taken.

Whether the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was invalid for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of publication in newspapers circulating in the locality and publication of its substance at convenient places in the locality?

Whether the petitioner was deprived of his substantive right to file objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act because of the defective publication and absence of effective notice?

Whether the subsequent declaration under Section 6, award, and other acquisition proceedings could survive once the foundational Section 4 notification was held invalid?

Whether invocation of the urgency power under Section 17(2) could cure or justify the procedural defects in the acquisition proceedings?

The Court applied Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which required cumulative publication of the preliminary notification in the Official Gazette, in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality—at least one in the regional language—and public notice of its substance at convenient places in the locality.

Relying on Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan, State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib, J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul, and Union of India v. Gopaldas Bhagwan Das, the Court held that these statutory modes of publication were mandatory and could not be treated as empty formalities.

Under Special Duty Collector, Land Acquisition, C.M.D.A. v. J. Sivaprakasam, publication in newspapers having no circulation in the locality vitiates the notification and consequential acquisition proceedings, particularly where the affected person establishes lack of notice.

Section 5A confers a substantive and valuable right to object to the proposed acquisition, as recognised in Union of India v. Mukesh Hans.

The Court further applied Article 300A of the Constitution and the principle that expropriatory legislation must be strictly construed and followed.

Section 17(2), being an exceptional urgency provision, could be invoked only upon strict satisfaction of its statutory conditions and not merely by asserting urgency.

The Court found that the respondents had taken contradictory positions regarding the newspapers in which the Section 4 notification was allegedly published and had not explained the discrepancies between their reply, the award, and later affidavits.

Despite the petitioner specifically disputing the existence and circulation of the newspapers, the respondents produced neither the newspapers nor any material proving that they circulated in Niwai.

The petitioner’s evidence, including the affidavit of a local newspaper merchant who was unaware of the alleged newspapers, remained unrebutted.

The Court therefore concluded that the respondents failed to establish compliance with the newspaper-publication requirement and that the petitioner had not received effective notice of the acquisition.

This failure deprived him of the opportunity to invoke Section 5A, which was a substantive safeguard rather than a procedural formality.

The award could not independently validate the acquisition because it was merely a consequential step founded on the defective Section 4 notification.

The Court also rejected the respondents’ reliance on the industrial urgency arising from the proposed shifting of industries from Delhi, observing that the alleged Section 17(2) notification was not shown to have been published in the Official Gazette and did not demonstrate the statutory basis for invoking urgency.

The Section 4 notification dated 15 September 1994, the Section 6 declaration dated 24 August 1995 published on 31 August 1995, and all consequential proceedings, including the award, were quashed insofar as they related to the petitioner’s land.

The respondents were restrained from interfering with the petitioner’s ownership and possession of the land pursuant to the impugned acquisition proceedings.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed, and pending applications were disposed of.