Non-furnishing of enquiry report to delinquent employee violates natural justice, necessitating de novo proceedings from report stage.

The petitioner, a Rifleman (Driver) in the Tripura State Rifles (TSR), was subjected to a departmental proceeding under Rule 14 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965, for allegedly forging the signature and seal of a Drawing and Disbursing Officer (DDO) on a guarantor form.

Following an inquiry where the charges were found "proved beyond doubt," the Disciplinary Authority issued a provisional order of "Removal from Service" on 23.09.2024.

After considering the petitioner’s representation regarding his family's economic condition, the Authority passed a final order on 18.10.2024 imposing "Compulsory Retirement".

The Appellate Authority affirmed this decision on 18.02.2025.

The petitioner challenged these orders on the ground that the inquiry report was never furnished to him before the imposition of punishment, violating principles of natural justice.

1. Whether the non-furnishing of the Inquiring Authority’s report to the delinquent employee before the Disciplinary Authority reaches a conclusion constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice.

2. Whether the "test of prejudice" must be applied in instances where a mandatory procedural requirement, such as supplying an inquiry report, is bypassed.

The court primarily applied the principles of natural justice as enshrined in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

It relied on the landmark precedent *Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (1993)*, which established that an employee has a fundamental right to receive the inquiry report to defend themselves effectively, regardless of whether statutory rules specifically mandate it.

The court further applied the recent ruling in *State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh (2025)*, which clarifies that furnishing the inquiry report is a mandatory procedural step and that "prejudice is self-evident" when this right is denied, shifting the burden of justification to the employer.

The court noted that while the respondents claimed the petitioner was given ample opportunity to inspect documents during the inquiry, the State-respondents explicitly admitted that the final inquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner prior to the imposition of punishment.

Applying the *B. Karunakar* doctrine, the court reasoned that the right to representation against the findings of an inquiry officer is an integral part of the "reasonable opportunity" to defend oneself.

The court rejected the notion that the petitioner needed to prove specific prejudice, as the Supreme Court in *Ram Prakash Singh* held that such a procedural lapse is inherently invalidating unless the employee has expressly waived the right.

Consequently, the court found the entire disciplinary proceeding flawed from the stage the report was finalized.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the orders of both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, and remanded the matter back to the respondent authority.

The Disciplinary Authority was directed to supply the inquiry report to the petitioner and allow him to submit a fresh defense/representation before passing a new order in accordance with the law within three months.