Non-incorporation of dying declaration in Section 313 statement vitiates its reliance, but specific dowry harassment evidence sustains conviction.

The Appellants, Nanak Chand (husband) and Veermati (mother-in-law), were convicted by the Trial Court for offences under Sections 498-A/304-B IPC following the death of Arti (the deceased) due to 100% burn injuries on October 4, 2002.

Married in April 2000, the deceased had lived with her parents from February to September 2002 due to alleged dowry harassment (demands for ₹50,000 or a plot) and returned to her matrimonial home only 12 days before the incident.

A dying declaration was recorded by an SDM wherein the deceased specifically accused Veermati of pouring kerosene and setting her on fire.

The Appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of vague allegations, non-examination of material witnesses, and the failure of the Trial Court to put the incriminating contents of the dying declaration to them during their Section 313 CrPC examination.

1. Whether the failure to specifically put the contents of a dying declaration to the accused during examination under Section 313 CrPC renders that evidence inadmissible.

2. Whether the conviction under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence and oral testimonies independent of the dying declaration.

The court applied Section 304-B IPC regarding dowry death, which requires proof of unnatural death within seven years of marriage linked to dowry-related cruelty "soon before death".

It relied on the procedural mandate of Section 313 CrPC, which requires the court to put every material incriminating circumstance to the accused to ensure a fair trial.

Precedents including Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh v. State of U.P. established that circumstances not put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC must be excluded from consideration if prejudice is caused.

The court applied the standard for proving dowry harassment through the testimonies of related witnesses as per Karan Singh v. State of Haryana.

The High Court found a significant procedural lapse: the Trial Court failed to confront the Appellants with the specific allegation in the dying declaration—that Veermati poured kerosene and lit the fire—during their Section 313 CrPC statements.

Given Veermati’s illiteracy, this omission caused material prejudice; consequently, the dying declaration was excluded from evidence.

The testimonies of PW-1 (father) and PW-2 (uncle) provided specific, non-vague accounts of persistent demands for a plot or cash and established that the deceased was only sent back to her in-laws 12 days prior after a mediated settlement.

Medical evidence (100% flame burns) and the recovery of kerosene-soaked rubber gloves and a plastic can from the kitchen corroborated a non-accidental death.

The Appellants’ conduct—being absent from the home/hospital and their apprehension at the Badarpur border—further pointed toward guilt.

The court held that the foundational facts for "dowry death" and "cruelty" were proved beyond reasonable doubt through oral and circumstantial evidence.

The High Court upheld the conviction and sentences (3 years for 498-A and life imprisonment for Veermati under 304-B). The appeals were dismissed, and the Appellants were directed to surrender within two weeks.