Non-supply of enquiry report constitutes a fatal procedural lapse, necessitating the quashing of dismissal orders.

The Respondent (writ petitioner), a Driver at Eastern Coalfield Ltd., was dismissed from service on 18.02.1993 following a departmental inquiry into charges of insubordination and assault

Parallelly, he was convicted in a criminal case based on the same facts, but was later acquitted by the Appellate Court on 12.04.2001

The petitioner sought reconsideration of his dismissal in light of the acquittal

After an initial writ petition (W.P. 880(W) of 2002), the High Court directed the Disciplinary Authority to consider the representation

The Authority rejected it on 27.09.2004, stating the dismissal was not set aside by the court

A second writ petition was filed, and the Single Judge remanded the matter on 24.12.2014 to verify if the enquiry report had been served on the petitioner

The appellant (Employer) challenged this remand order, arguing the petitioner had already superannuated on 30.06.2014, making compliance impossible

1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated due to the non-supply of the enquiry report to the delinquent employee prior to the imposition of punishment

2. Whether the Disciplinary Authority failed to comply with the judicial directions to consider the impact of the criminal acquittal on the departmental punishment

3. Whether the employer can be allowed to conduct a de novo inquiry or continue proceedings after the employee has reached the age of superannuation and after decades of procedural default

The court primarily applied the principle established in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991), which made the furnishing of the enquiry report to the delinquent employee mandatory

It further relied on Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (1993), which mandates that if an enquiry report is not furnished, the court should set aside the punishment and allow the authority to proceed from the stage of furnishing the report, provided it caused prejudice

Additionally, the court applied the Latin maxim commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no party can take advantage of its own wrong), as interpreted in Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2007) and Mrutunjay Pani v. Narmada Bala Sasmal (1961)

The Court found that the Disciplinary Authority’s order dated 18.02.1993 did not record the service of the enquiry report upon the petitioner, violating principles of natural justice

The Court observed that despite two specific opportunities granted by the Writ Court (in 2004 and 2014), the appellant failed to rectify these procedural infirmities or properly consider the petitioner’s representation regarding his acquittal

While the appellant argued that superannuation barred further proceedings, the Court held that the appellant could not benefit from its own decades-long defaults and failure to act in accordance with law

Given the repeated lapses and the fact that the petitioner had been deprived of his rights for over two decades, the Court determined that allowing a de novo inquiry at this late stage would be unjust

It held that because the authorities repeatedly failed to avail themselves of the liberties granted by the court to fix procedural errors, they are now barred from initiating fresh proceedings

The Court modified the Single Judge's order to grant the petitioner full consequential benefits and arrears of salary, rather than deferring them

The appellant was directed to pay all monetary benefits to the petitioner within eight weeks. The appeal and the writ petition were disposed of accordingly