Non-traceability of approval records alone cannot invalidate appointments or establish fraud.

The fifteen petitioners were appointed as Assistant Teachers in privately managed, recognised basic schools receiving grant-in-aid from the Social Welfare Department. Their appointments were made between 2010 and 2016, allegedly pursuant to advertisements, selection proceedings and approvals of the District Basic Education Officer, Mau; the State Government subsequently granted financial approval and salaries were paid for several years.

Following an FIR and withholding of salary in 2018, a three-member inquiry was conducted. Its report dated 28 November 2018 led the State Government, by order dated 24 July 2019, to cancel the appointments of four other teachers, but no adverse action was taken against the present petitioners.

A subsequent inquiry was initiated after questions were raised in the Legislative Assembly regarding appointments made after 2014. Reports dated 25 April, 13 June, 17 June and 23 June 2025 stated that approval of the petitioners’ appointments was not available in the records.

The petitioners challenged the adverse reports and consequential orders principally on the grounds of violation of natural justice, inconsistency with the earlier inquiry and government approval, and failure to establish fraud or breach of the applicable recruitment rules.

Whether the respondents could treat the petitioners’ appointments as illegal or fraudulent merely because the original approval records were not traceable or were not found in the departmental files.

Whether the respondents established that prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer was a mandatory requirement applicable to the petitioners’ appointments on the respective dates of appointment, and that the requirement was violated in each case.

Whether the adverse reports and consequential directions could be sustained when they were made without adequately considering the earlier inquiry report, the State Government’s order dated 24 July 2019, the documentary material produced by the petitioners and the managements, and the petitioners’ opportunity to respond.

Whether the State could reopen and unsettle appointments previously scrutinised, approved and acted upon for several years without identifying fresh material and recording a reasoned, petitioner-specific determination.

The Court applied Rule 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Other Conditions) Rules, 1975, as amended in 1977, which requires prescribed qualifications, prior written approval of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, prescribed advertisement and a lawful selection process.

However, invocation of a mandatory rule does not by itself prove its applicability or establish its violation in an individual case; the authority must identify the governing legal regime, the precise breach and the supporting evidence.

The Court applied the principles of audi alteram partem, reasoned administrative decision-making and non-arbitrariness, particularly where adverse findings carry civil consequences.

Relying on Naresh Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 814, it held that non-traceability or non-availability of official records does not, by itself, establish forgery or fraud.

Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 was applied for the rule that an administrative order must stand on the reasons contained in it and cannot subsequently be supported by new grounds.

Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 supported the requirement of a reasoned order showing a rational nexus between the material and the conclusion.

The Court held that the respondents had not bridged the necessary gap between asserting that Rule 9 applied and proving, petitioner-wise, that the rule was violated.

The earlier three-member inquiry had examined the appointments, and the State Government had cancelled the appointments of four teachers but consciously left the present petitioners undisturbed; that administrative history could not simply be ignored in the later inquiry.

The respondents’ own positions regarding the necessity of prior approval were inconsistent, and they failed to clearly identify the statutory source, temporal applicability and mandatory character of the alleged approval requirement.

Further, the existence of dispatch-register entries, approval communications, selection records and financial-sanction orders required substantive verification rather than rejection through a bare assertion that the original records were unavailable.

The Court held that non-traceability of departmental records could justify further inquiry but could not itself prove fabrication, fraud or culpability of the petitioners.

Since the reports and the order dated 18 July 2025 carried adverse civil consequences, the petitioners were entitled to disclosure of the material relied upon and a meaningful opportunity to explain and produce supporting documents.

The State remained entitled to undertake a lawful inquiry, but it could not predetermine the result or treat the Legislative Assembly question as proof of illegality.

The adverse reports dated 25 April, 13 June, 17 June and 23 June 2025 and the consequential order dated 18 July 2025 were set aside insofar as they recorded adverse conclusions against the petitioners without the required legal and evidentiary foundation; consequential action founded exclusively upon those reports was also quashed.

The respondents were permitted to conduct a fresh or further inquiry strictly in accordance with law, confined to the governmental mandate, and required to consider the earlier inquiry, the order dated 24 July 2019, the criminal final reports, original records and the documentary material of all concerned parties.

Any fresh inquiry must be petitioner-specific, identify the applicable statutory provision and precise breach, establish any alleged fraud or misrepresentation, provide a meaningful hearing, and culminate in a reasoned and speaking order.

Until such lawful determination, the petitioners were not to be treated as removed from service merely on the basis of the impugned reports, and their salary claim for the period during which they actually discharged duties was to be reconsidered under the applicable statutory and financial framework.

There was no order as to costs.