Ocular testimony prevails over conflicting medical opinion unless the medical evidence rules out all possibility of the oral version.

The appellants, Kali Das and Chhotey Lal, were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mirzapur, on 19.04.1985 for the murder of Mangla Singh under Sections 302 and 302/34 of the IPC, respectively.

On 26.07.1983, while the deceased was going to relieve himself, Chhotey Lal exhorted Kali Das to kill him due to long-standing litigation over an injured goat.

Kali Das assaulted the deceased with a gandasa on the head and thigh.

The FIR was lodged within 4.5 hours.

The victim remained hospitalized across multiple facilities, underwent brain surgery, and eventually succumbed to his injuries on 22.10.1983.

The appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of delayed FIR, doubt regarding eye-witness presence, inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, and the failure of the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to properly record a dying declaration.

1. Whether the FIR was prompt and credible, and whether the testimony of PW-1 constitutes res gestae evidence.

2. Whether an inconsistency between ocular testimony describing a gandasa blow and medical evidence describing an abrasion on the thigh is fatal to the prosecution case.

3. Whether omissions in Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements amount to contradictions that vitiate the testimony of witnesses if those contradictions are not proved per Section 145 of the Evidence Act.

4. Whether Chhotey Lal is vicariously liable under Section 34 IPC based solely on an act of oral exhortation.

The court applied Section 302 (Murder) and Section 34 (Common Intention) of the IPC.

It relied on Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the doctrine of res gestae to admit the testimony of witnesses who arrived immediately after the act.

Regarding ocular versus medical evidence, it followed Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala, holding ocular evidence is superior unless medical evidence rules out the possibility of the ocular version being true.

For the use of previous statements, the court applied Section 162 Cr.P.C. and Section 145 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing that contradictions and "material omissions" must be specifically proved through the I.O. to discredit a witness, as established in V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand.

Finally, it applied the principle from Gulab v. State of U.P., holding that crucial exhortation establishes common intention under Section 34 IPC.

The Court found the FIR prompt, as the delay was explained by the physical necessity of carrying the victim on a cot to the station.

It held that PW-1 was a valid res gestae witness because he saw the appellants escaping with the weapon immediately after the assault.

Addressing the medical discrepancy, the Court reasoned that the second gandasa blow likely resulted in an abrasion due to the folds of the victim's clothing or the angle of the strike; thus, the ocular account remained "trustworthy" despite the doctor’s opinion.

The Court rejected the defense's attempt to use "omissions" as contradictions because the defense failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 145 of the Evidence Act—specifically, they did not prove the suspected contradictions through the I.O. during his examination.

Regarding the lack of a formal dying declaration, the Court held it was not fatal as the sturdy ocular testimony of three eye-witnesses (PW-2, PW-3, PW-4) sufficiently proved the guilt.

It further held that Chhotey Lal shared a common intention under Section 34 IPC because his exhortation was the immediate catalyst for the fatal assault.

The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the life sentences for both appellants.

The Court ordered the appellants, who were on bail, to surrender within six weeks or face arrest.