### Ocular Testimony Suffering From Material Contradictions and Improbable Observations Fails to Establish Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt

On February 11, 2001, a massacre occurred in village Meharavan Khera, resultantly killing five family members (Sarju, Chandrika, Smt. Satana, Mangal, and Ram Khelawan) and injuring a minor, Arvind (P.W.3).

The complainant, Guddu (P.W.2), alleged the attack was motivated by a 19-year-old family feud involving the murder of his uncle, Kishan.

Fifteen named and 7-8 unknown persons were accused of attacking the victims with firearms and axes.

The Trial Court convicted eleven appellants under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 452, and 404 of the IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment, while acquitting three others and clearing all of charges under the Arms Act.

The appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of delayed/ante-timed FIR, lack of independent witnesses, and unreliable ocular testimony.

1. Whether the ocular testimony of P.W.1, P.W.2, and P.W.3 was reliable and sufficient to sustain a conviction despite material contradictions and lack of independent witnesses?

2. Whether the prosecution proved the identity of the appellants as the assailants given the alleged poor lighting conditions and the fact that the attackers had covered their faces?

3. Whether the Trial Court erred in convicting the named appellants while acquitting non-named accused on the same set of evidence?

The Court applied Section 149 of the IPC regarding vicarious liability in an unlawful assembly.

The Court applied the evidentiary standards for "injured" and "related" witnesses under the Indian Evidence Act.

It relied on State of U.P. v. Naresh (2011) to establish that while an injured witness’s testimony is accorded special status, it can be rejected if there are glaring contradictions.

It further applied the principle from Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (1954) that related witnesses are not necessarily "interested," but their testimony requires careful scrutiny for inherent probability.

Finally, it invoked the doctrine from Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) that if two reasonable views are possible, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted.

The High Court found the prosecution's ocular evidence fundamentally flawed.

The presence of the eye-witnesses (P.W.1, P.W.2, and P.W.3) was deemed doubtful due to conduct inconsistent with natural human behavior; specifically, P.W.1 allegedly abandoned her husband's body to stay at her parents' house for days.

P.W.2 claimed to witness a multi-location massacre while hiding behind gunny bags in a single room.

The Court noted the impossibility of recognizing 23-24 assailants in the dark (lighted only by lanterns/diyas) when the attackers had covered their faces with towels.

Medical evidence contradicted oral testimony: P.W.1 claimed to be beaten with lathis, yet had no medical report.

The minor P.W.3’s injuries were not commensurate with an attack by 7-8 persons.

The Court criticized the Trial Court for assuming the appellants' guilt at the outset rather than neutral evaluation.

The Court highlighted the inconsistency in acquitting non-named accused while convicting named ones based on the same untrustworthy testimony.

The Court answered the issues in favor of the appellants, ruling that poor visibility and the witnesses' hiding positions precluded certain identification.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgment and order dated December 18, 2004, allowed the appeals, and acquitted all appellants, granting them the benefit of the doubt.

The appellants were ordered to be released forthwith.