Omission to provide medical aid constitutes Section 304A IPC only if it is the proximate cause of death.

The deceased, Jyoti Bala, died on 16.05.2007 due to a snake bite sustained while staying at the house of the respondent, her brother-in-law

The prosecution alleged that after the bite, the respondent negligently took the deceased to a sorcerer (PW5) instead of a hospital, leading to her death

The sorcerer advised the respondent to seek medical help

The Trial Court acquitted the respondent of charges under Section 304A IPC, holding that the snake bite, not the respondent's conduct, was the proximate cause of death

The State appealed this acquittal

1. Whether the failure of the respondent to provide immediate medical treatment constitutes a "rash or negligent act" under Section 304A of the IPC

2. Whether the omission to take the deceased to a hospital was the proximate and efficient cause of death

Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) regarding causing death by negligence.

The fundamental principle that for an "omission" to be punishable, it must be "illegal," meaning a breach of a specific direction of law or a ground for civil action

High threshold for interfering with acquittals established in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025) and Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka (2026)

Ratios from Queen v. Morby [L.R. 8 Q.B.D. 571] and Regina v. Broughton [2021], which mandate that the prosecution prove the neglect was a "significant contributory cause" that actually shortened life, rather than a mere possibility of saving it

The court reasoned that the prosecution failed to establish a legal duty of care whose breach (omission) would be considered "illegal" under the IPC

The court noted the absence of expert medical testimony from the autopsy surgeon (PW6) suggesting that the deceased’s life could definitely have been saved had she been hospitalized sooner

Following Queen v. Morby, the court held that a mere "possibility" of survival is insufficient for a criminal conviction

The court considered the socio-economic context: the respondent was of humble means (a hairdresser living in a kaccha house) and behaved as a reasonable person in his community might by visiting a locally renowned healer (PW5)

The respondent's actions did not meet the standard of "gross negligence" required to overturn an acquittal

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Trial Court's judgment of acquittal. The respondents were directed to furnish bail bonds as per Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.