Once a service receives four-tier pay scales, denying notional benefits from the scheme’s operative date violates Article 14.

The petitioners were inducted into the Himachal Pradesh Forest Service (“HPFS”) in 1990 and completed eight years of service in 1998, following which they were granted the applicable time-scale benefits.

The State introduced a four-tier pay-scale structure for certain categories through instructions dated 23.06.2000, but HPFS was not initially included.

By instructions dated 09.08.2012, the four-tier structure was restored for eight specified services with notional effect from 27.08.2009 and actual effect from 09.08.2012; HPFS was again excluded.

Subsequently, by instructions dated 26.08.2013, HPFS was granted the four-tier pay scale with actual effect from 01.09.2013, including a higher grade pay after completion of 14 years of regular service.

The petitioners had completed 14 years of service in 2004 and claimed that they were entitled to the benefit from 01.01.2006, or at least notionally from 27.08.2009, on parity with HPAS officers and the other services covered by the 09.08.2012 instructions.

Their representation was rejected by communication dated 26.11.2014, which they challenged in the present petition.

Whether the petitioners, having subsequently been granted the four-tier pay structure as members of HPFS, were entitled to its notional benefit from 27.08.2009, when the State had extended the benefit to other specified services?

Whether denial of the notional benefit to HPFS, while granting it to HPAS and other similarly situated services, was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution?

Whether the petitioners were entitled to the four-tier pay-scale benefit from 01.01.2006 on the basis of completion of 14 years’ service in 2004 and the revised pay structure?

The Court applied the constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14 and 16, including the principle that similarly situated government employees cannot be subjected to arbitrary differential treatment.

It relied on Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586, which holds that although equation of posts and determination of pay scales ordinarily lie within the executive and expert bodies’ domain, judicial intervention is permissible where employees holding identical or substantially similar posts are treated differently on an irrational, arbitrary or unjust basis.

The Court also relied on Union of India v. DGOF Employees Association, (2023) 15 Scale 293, reaffirming that courts should not themselves undertake complex pay fixation but may correct discriminatory or irrational denial of an otherwise applicable benefit.

Union of India v. Satya Brata Chowdhury, (2008) 16 SCC 383, was relied upon for the principle that the State cannot give differential treatment to its employees without justification.

The respondents’ reliance on P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and Union of India v. Basudeba Dora, (2003) 2 SCC 632, concerning executive primacy in pay-scale determination, was qualified by the Court’s power to examine arbitrary State action.

The Court accepted that the State ordinarily possesses discretion to determine pay structures and that HPFS and HPAS were not identical in every respect.

However, the State had itself extended the four-tier pay structure to HPFS from 01.09.2013, thereby recognising the category’s entitlement to that structure.

Since other specified services, including HPAS, had received the same benefit notionally from 27.08.2009, the Court found no rational justification for denying HPFS the corresponding notional benefit, particularly when the record showed that HPFS officers were posted against positions ordinarily occupied by HPAS officers and performed comparable functions in relevant contexts.

The Court therefore treated the differential treatment as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16.

It rejected the claim for retrospective benefit from 01.01.2006, reasoning that the State had consciously introduced or restored the relevant scheme only from 27.08.2009.

Thus, the permissible relief was notional application from 27.08.2009, followed by actual monetary benefit from 01.09.2013 under the 26.08.2013 instructions.

The communication dated 26.11.2014 rejecting the petitioners’ representation was quashed.

The respondents were directed to grant the petitioners the four-tier pay-scale benefit notionally from 27.08.2009 and actually from 01.09.2013, in accordance with the instructions dated 26.08.2013.

The claim for entitlement from 01.01.2006 was not accepted.

Arrears were directed to be released within three months; failing such payment, the petitioners would be entitled to interest at 6% per annum from the date of judgment until actual payment.