Once the first appeal is decided, the trial decree merges and cannot be independently appealed.

The first respondent instituted a suit seeking declaration and injunction concerning 1 acre and 16 cents of land.

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit in respect of 58 cents.

The first respondent preferred A.S.No.50 of 2015, subsequently transferred to the Sub Court, Manamadurai and renumbered as A.S.No.10 of 2019.

The petitioners entered appearance and actively contested that appeal but did not file an appeal or cross-objection challenging the decree concerning 58 cents.

The first respondent’s appeal was dismissed, confirming the Trial Court’s findings.

Thereafter, the petitioners sought to file an independent appeal against the Trial Court’s decree with a delay of 2,717 days.

They attributed the delay to the first petitioner’s illness, native treatment, inability to contact counsel, and subsequent legal advice received after disposal of the first respondent’s appeal.

The First Appellate Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, leading to the present revision petition under Section 115 CPC.

Whether the petitioners established “sufficient cause” for condoning the extraordinary delay of 2,717 days in filing an appeal against the Trial Court’s decree.

Whether the petitioners could maintain an independent appeal against the Trial Court’s decree after participating in and contesting the first respondent’s appeal without filing a cross-objection or independent appeal, and after disposal of that appeal.

Whether the First Appellate Court committed an error warranting interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court applied the principle under Section 5 of the Limitation Act that delay may be condoned only where the applicant establishes a genuine and legally sufficient cause for the entire delay.

It also applied Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which revisional interference is justified only where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction, or acted with material irregularity.

The Court further relied on the procedural principle embodied in Order XLI Rule 22 CPC that a respondent aggrieved by any part of a decree may file a cross-objection in the opposing party’s appeal, or pursue an independent appeal within limitation.

The Court held that, once the decree of the Trial Court was affirmed in the appeal, the decree merged with the appellate decree, making a belated independent challenge to the Trial Court’s decree impermissible in the circumstances.

No specific judicial precedents were cited in the judgment.

The Court found that the petitioners’ explanation was vague because the affidavit did not disclose the nature, duration, or particulars of the first petitioner’s alleged illness or substantiate why it prevented the filing of an appeal for 2,717 days.

The assertion regarding native treatment was therefore insufficient to constitute “sufficient cause”.

Further, the petitioners had appeared through counsel and actively contested the first respondent’s appeal, making their claim that they obtained legal advice to file an appeal only after that appeal was disposed of inherently unbelievable.

The Court also held that the petitioners could have filed a cross-objection or independent appeal while the first respondent’s appeal was pending.

Having failed to do so and having allowed the appellate decree to be passed, they could not subsequently maintain an independent, highly delayed challenge to the Trial Court’s decree.

Consequently, the First Appellate Court’s refusal to condone the delay disclosed no jurisdictional or material error warranting revision.

Finding no error in the First Appellate Court’s order, the Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition.

No costs were awarded.