‘Or otherwise’ under Section 3E encompasses indirect transfers through parting with possession of rehabilitation tenements.

The petitioner was recorded as an eligible beneficiary in Annexure II and was allotted Flat No. 408, Kushinara CHS, under a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.

She executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Nitin Patel and permitted him to remain in possession of the flat with his family.

In 2015, respondent No. 3 was found residing in the flat and stated to the Inspection Officer that she was occupying it as a tenant.

On that basis, the authorities concluded that the petitioner had parted with possession in breach of Section 3E of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, and directed eviction.

The petitioner’s statutory appeal was dismissed on 18 June 2016, prompting the present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

The petitioner argued that there was no registered sale, lease, gift, exchange, or other documentary proof of transfer, whereas the respondents relied on the inspection report and the alleged handing over of possession.

1. Whether the petitioner had transferred or otherwise parted with possession of the rehabilitation tenement in contravention of Section 3E(1) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act, despite the absence of a registered sale deed, lease deed, or other formal conveyance.

2. Whether the authorities were justified in directing eviction under Section 3E(2) on the basis of the Power of Attorney, the petitioner’s non-occupation, and respondent No. 3’s occupation as a tenant.

3. Whether the allegations concerning the petitioner’s alleged fraudulent inclusion in Annexure II and the original occupant’s competing claim could be determined in proceedings under Section 3E.

The Court applied Section 3E(1) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, which prohibits transfer of a rehabilitation tenement by “sale, gift, exchange, lease or otherwise” during the prescribed period and requires permission of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority for transfers thereafter.

Section 3E(2) authorises the Competent Authority to evict a person found in possession where the tenement has been transferred in contravention of Section 3E(1), subject to a reasonable opportunity to show cause.

The expression “or otherwise” was construed broadly to include indirect arrangements by which the allottee parts with possession or enjoyment, even without a registered conveyance.

The Court relied on Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, (1957) 1 SCC 411, which held that “or otherwise” is a phrase of extension covering all possible modes; Vinayakrao v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 Bom 10, which treated enumerated modes of transfer as non-exhaustive; and Naginbhai Lallubhai Patel v. Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 2003 (3) Mah LJ 678, which held that “otherwise” is intended to plug avenues of escape.

However, the authorities must still establish, on material evidence, that the allottee actually parted with possession; mere suspicion or assumption is insufficient.

The Court held that the absence of a registered sale or lease deed did not resolve the matter because Section 3E expressly extends beyond formal transfers through the words “or otherwise”.

The relevant inquiry was therefore the substance and effect of the arrangement.

The petitioner’s Power of Attorney placed Nitin Patel in possession, while the inspection report recorded that respondent No. 3 was occupying the flat as a tenant and that the original allottee was not residing there.

The Society’s No Objection Certificate merely showed that Nitin Patel had occupied the flat for some time; it did not explain respondent No. 3’s subsequent occupation or establish that the petitioner continued to reside there.

Taken cumulatively, these circumstances provided sufficient material for the authorities to infer that the petitioner had parted with possession in a manner prohibited by Section 3E.

The Court further held that allegations regarding the petitioner’s eligibility, fraudulent inclusion in Annexure II, and rival claims of the original occupant fell outside the limited scope of Section 3E proceedings, which concerned only the alleged prohibited transfer.

The authorities had therefore acted within jurisdiction and complied with the requisite opportunity to show cause.

The inspection material, the petitioner’s non-occupation, the Power of Attorney, and respondent No. 3’s occupation as a tenant justified the authorities’ conclusion that Section 3E was attracted.

The writ petition was dismissed; the order of the Competent Authority directing eviction and the order of the Appellate Authority were upheld.

The Rule was discharged, with no order as to costs, and any pending interim applications were disposed of.