Order IX Rule 13 relief turns on sufficient cause for absence on the ex parte hearing date.

The appellant, defendant No. 7, defended a suit seeking to invalidate two sale deeds concerning agricultural land, asserting that she was a bona fide purchaser under a registered sale deed and was in possession.

After her advocate died, neither she nor her counsel appeared on 19 July 2024, and the suit was ordered to proceed ex parte against her.

On learning of the proceedings, she engaged new counsel and applied under Order IX Rule 7 CPC to recall the ex-parte order; that application was dismissed for non-prosecution on 28 October 2024, without a decision on its merits.

The court then passed an ex-parte decree on 29 January 2025, declaring the sale deeds void and granting an injunction.

The appellant applied under Order IX Rule 13 CPC within nine days, but the application was rejected on 5 August 2026, principally because her earlier Rule 7 application had been dismissed and she had knowledge of the ex-parte proceedings.

Whether the appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called on 19 July 2024, warranting setting aside the ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

Whether the dismissal for non-prosecution of the appellant’s earlier Order IX Rule 7 application, and the decree’s finality against co-defendants, precluded relief under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

Order IX Rule 13 CPC permits an ex-parte decree to be set aside where summons was not duly served or the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called for hearing; the inquiry under the second limb focuses on the date of non-appearance.

“Sufficient cause” is elastic and must be assessed in the circumstances of each case, with a justice-oriented approach that avoids imputing negligence where the party acted bona fide; an advocate’s default ordinarily should not cause an innocent litigant to suffer.

The Court applied *G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada*, (2000) 3 SCC 54, and *A. Murugesan v. Smt. Jamuna Rani*, (2019) 20 SCC 803, for the rule that the inquiry concerns the defendant’s absence on the date the matter was called, not ordinarily earlier conduct.

An unadjudicated dismissal of an Order IX Rule 7 application does not, by itself, foreclose a statutory application under Order IX Rule 13.

The appellant had appeared, filed a written statement, and contested the suit for years; the Court accepted that her absence on 19 July 2024 followed the death of her conducting advocate and was bona fide.

After learning of the ex-parte proceedings, she promptly engaged new counsel and sought recall. The later dismissal of that application for non-prosecution was not a merits determination of the cause for her original absence, and the Court declined to treat counsel’s subsequent default as proof of the appellant’s lack of bona fides.

The ex-parte decree materially prejudiced her: the plaintiff’s evidence was not cross-examined, the defendants’ burdened issues were decided without their evidence, and the appellant could not present her claimed defence and supporting compromise document.

Her independent claim as a subsequent purchaser also meant that the co-defendants’ failure to pursue their remedies did not defeat her application.

It set aside the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 29 January 2025 qua the appellant, restored the suit, and directed an expedited trial, preferably within six months.

It also set aside the 28 October 2024 dismissal of the appellant’s Order IX Rule 7 application and directed the trial court to decide that application on its merits.