Order rejecting temporary injunction in appeal is not appealable but maintainable under Article 227.

The petitioner was a sub-lessee/assignee of a brickfield belonging to the respondent deity (Sri Sri Radha Mohan Jew) under a 33-year registered deed of assignment that expired in 2013.

The petitioner filed Title Suit No. 160 of 2015 for declaration and injunction after the deity refused to renew the lease, alleging that subsequent lessees (Respondent No. 2) forcibly dispossessed him and damaged machinery.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding the petitioner was not in possession at the time of filing and had committed fraud by suppressing facts.

In the subsequent appeal (Title Appeal No. 41 of 2024), the petitioner sought a temporary injunction, which the Additional District Judge, Diamond Harbour, rejected via Order No. 13 dated 30.07.2025.

The petitioner challenged this rejection via a Civil Revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether a Civil Revisional application under Article 227 is maintainable against an order passed by an Appellate Court rejecting a temporary injunction application in a pending appeal.

2. Whether the petitioner established a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury to warrant an injunction despite the expiry of the lease and dismissal of the original suit.

Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which grants appellate courts the same powers as original courts but distinguishes appellate orders from original orders.

Full Bench precedent in Sabyasachi Chatterjee v. Prasad Chatterjee and Mira Chatterjee v. Joydeb Chatterjee, which establish that an interlocutory order passed by an Appellate Court is not appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the CPC, as that provision applies only to orders by courts of original jurisdiction.

The "triple test" of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, alongside the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, which bars declaratory relief where a plaintiff omits to seek further consequential relief like recovery of possession.

The Court first resolved the maintainability conflict, holding that since the impugned order was passed by an Appellate Court (not a Trial Court), it falls outside the scope of Order 43 Rule 1(r), making the Article 227 revision the appropriate remedy.

On the merits, the Court observed that the petitioner’s lease had expired by efflux of time in 2013 under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act.

The Court highlighted that the Trial Court had already found the petitioner’s claim of continued possession to be fraudulent and fabricated.

Since the petitioner failed to seek recovery of "Khas possession" or the cancellation of the new lease in favor of Respondent No. 2, the suit was likely barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

The Court concluded that without current possession or a valid subsisting legal right to the property, the petitioner failed the "triple test" for an injunction.

The Court affirmed that the Appellate Court correctly rejected the injunction application as there was no prima facie case or balance of convenience in favor of a non-possessory erstwhile lessee whose suit had been dismissed on merits.

The Revisional Application (C.O. No. 3351 of 2025) was dismissed, and all interim orders were vacated.