Order XVIII Rule 17 permits recall after evidence closes to cross-examine on subsequently exhibited documents.

The petitioner challenged an order of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack, allowing Defendant No. 1’s application under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC to recall P.W.1 for further cross-examination.

The suit was for partition.

After the evidence had closed and the suit was posted for argument, the plaintiff had obtained permission to mark a certified copy of a Record of Rights as Ext. 9.

Defendant No. 1 sought recall to cross-examine P.W.1 concerning that exhibit; the plaintiff opposed, arguing that the application was belated and intended to delay the suit.

The trial court allowed recall, reasoning that the opportunity was necessary for proper adjudication.

The petitioner argued that Ext. 9 had been marked without objection, that no sufficient explanation for delay had been given, and that the document was irrelevant.

1. Whether the trial court’s decision to recall P.W.1 under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, so Defendant No. 1 could cross-examine him concerning Ext. 9, disclosed illegality or perversity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

2. Whether the High Court should direct the trial court to dispose of the suit within a stipulated time.

Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC empowers a court to recall and examine a witness at any stage, but the power is to be exercised sparingly and to clarify evidence or remove ambiguity—not to fill a party’s evidentiary lacuna.

In Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, the Supreme Court held that recall should not ordinarily be used to fill omissions in a witness’s evidence.

K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palaanisamy states that the power is not routine, should be exercised where bona fide additional evidence will assist the court, and must not become a means of protracting proceedings; costs and a fixed schedule may be appropriate safeguards.

Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh confirms that the power belongs to the court and may be exercised at any stage, including while judgment is being written, subject to the same limits.

Section 165 of the Evidence Act was also referred to in connection with the court’s power to ask questions to obtain proper proof of relevant facts.

The High Court noted that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC contains no restriction as to the stage at which recall may be ordered.

Ext. 9 had been marked at the plaintiff’s instance after the evidence had closed, and Defendant No. 1 had not been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine P.W.1 in relation to it.

In those circumstances, the trial court’s decision to permit further cross-examination was not shown to be illegal or perverse, nor was the recall found to be an attempt to fill a lacuna.

The High Court observed that costs could have been imposed when the application was allowed, but declined to impose them at that stage because doing so would require hearing Defendant No. 1 and delay disposal of the CMP.

As to expedition, the Court considered it inappropriate to impose a fixed deadline absent special circumstances, while requesting the trial court to avoid unnecessary adjournments.

It declined to impose a time-bound disposal direction but requested the trial court to endeavour to conclude the suit without unnecessary adjournments.