Orders affecting a bona fide purchaser’s title without hearing violate natural justice and are unsustainable.

The dispute concerned Survey No. 351, measuring 1.240 hectares, situated at Village Machakhurd, Tehsil Pohari, District Shivpuri.

The Tehsildar, by order dated 27.09.1995, recorded respondent No. 4 as Bhumiswami under Sections 110 and 190 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (“MPLRC”).

The petitioner subsequently purchased the land from respondent No. 4 through a registered sale deed dated 05.11.2008 for valuable consideration, following which her name was mutated in the revenue records as Bhumiswami.

Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 challenged the 1995 mutation order before the Additional Collector, but the revision was dismissed on 17.07.2009.

They thereafter instituted a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in which the petitioner was impleaded as defendant No. 2; the suit was withdrawn on 02.07.2013.

Subsequently, after more than two decades, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed an appeal under Section 44 of the MPLRC, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, without impleading the petitioner.

The Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the appeal on 24.05.2017.

The Commissioner, however, condoned the delay, allowed the appeal, and remanded the matter on 16.01.2018.

On remand, the Sub-Divisional Officer set aside the Tehsildar’s order dated 27.09.1995 on 18.02.2021, again without impleading or hearing the petitioner.

The petitioner challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the Commissioner and the Sub-Divisional Officer could adjudicate proceedings affecting the petitioner’s registered title and revenue status without impleading her and affording her an opportunity of hearing.

2. Whether the availability of a statutory appeal against the Sub-Divisional Officer’s order barred the petitioner from invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 where the orders were allegedly passed in breach of natural justice.

3. Whether the Commissioner’s remand order had merged into the subsequent order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, thereby rendering the challenge to the remand order not maintainable.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, which empowers the High Court to issue writs, including where a quasi-judicial order is passed in violation of natural justice.

It considered Sections 110 and 190 of the MPLRC concerning mutation and revenue entries, and Section 44 of the MPLRC governing appeals against revenue orders.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act was relevant to the respondents’ application for condonation of delay.

The Court applied the audi alteram partem rule: a person whose vested proprietary or civil rights are directly affected by an adjudication must be impleaded and given a reasonable and effective opportunity of hearing.

It further held that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not preclude writ jurisdiction where the impugned action violates natural justice or affects a necessary party without notice.

The Court also held that a subsequent order cannot cure a foundational defect where the proceedings themselves were initiated and continued without hearing the necessary affected party.

The petitioner’s registered sale deed of 05.11.2008 and continuous mutation in her favour established a direct and substantial proprietary interest in the disputed land.

The respondents’ prior civil suit, in which the petitioner was impleaded, demonstrated that they had knowledge of her interest.

Nevertheless, they failed to implead her in the revenue appeal and the proceedings following remand.

Since setting aside the 1995 Tehsildar order had the potential to undermine the title flowing to the petitioner from respondent No. 4, the petitioner was an indispensable necessary party, not merely a proper party.

The Commissioner’s remand order and the SDO’s consequential order were therefore made in breach of audi alteram partem.

In these circumstances, the alternative appellate remedy did not bar writ intervention.

Nor could the subsequent SDO order be treated as curing the defect in the Commissioner’s order, because the petitioner was excluded at both stages.

The Court consequently found the impugned proceedings fundamentally defective without entering into the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The matter was remanded to the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, with directions first to implead the petitioner as a necessary party and thereafter to reconsider the appeal afresh in accordance with law after providing all concerned parties a reasonable and effective opportunity of hearing.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the dispute.