Orissa HC Acquits Man Of Repeated-Rape Charge, Finding Prior Relationship And Testimony Variations Left Consent Unproven

The appellant was convicted under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.

The Trial Court acquitted him of the charges under Section 417 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, finding the victim’s age unproved; those acquittals were not challenged in this appeal.

The prosecution alleged repeated sexual intercourse resulting in pregnancy.

The victim’s Section 164 CrPC statement described a love relationship and a physical relationship developing on an assurance of marriage, while the appellant argued that her trial testimony materially differed from that statement and that the relationship was consensual.

During the appeal, the Court received reports that the appellant had served approximately nine years and nine months of his sentence and had satisfactory prison conduct.

Section 376(2)(n) IPC criminalises repeated rape, and the prosecution must prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. A prosecutrix’s testimony, if wholly reliable and trustworthy, may alone sustain a conviction; corroboration is not a legal prerequisite. However, the entire relationship and surrounding circumstances must be assessed when determining consent, and a failed relationship or unfulfilled promise of marriage does not, by itself, convert consensual intercourse into rape.

The Court also considered the principles in Bikash Behera v. State of Orissa, CRA No. 288 of 1997, concerning assessment of the relationship, surrounding circumstances, disclosure, and medical or scientific evidence.

Section 374(2) CrPC provided the procedural basis for the appeal.

The Court considered the victim’s Section 164 statement describing a love relationship alongside her trial testimony, and found material variation between the two.

It also took account of the prior relationship, the Trial Court’s acquittal on the marriage-promise charge, the absence of DNA evidence establishing the appellant’s paternity of the child, the lack of significant medical corroboration, and discrepancies concerning the FIR.

Although none of these circumstances alone defeated the prosecution case, the Court found that cumulatively they raised reasonable doubt as to whether the intercourse was without consent.

It therefore concluded that the victim’s testimony did not, in these circumstances, safely sustain the conviction.

It allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, and acquitted the appellant.

As he was in custody, the Court directed his release upon communication of the judgment.