Participation in a tender generally bars bidders from challenging eligibility conditions after technical rejection.

The petitioner participated in three tenders issued by the Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited for construction of railway over bridges under NIT Nos. BRPNNL/MZF/C029/317, BRPNNL/DBG/C009/351 and BRPNNL/BHG/C016/310, all dated 17 March 2025.

The tender documents prescribed the financial years 2020–21 to 2024–25 for assessing experience in completion of similar works, while prescribing 2019–20 to 2023–24 for assessing annual financial turnover.

The petitioner contended that the different periods were inconsistent with the Standard Bidding Document and arbitrary.

It submitted a representation dated 25 April 2025, allegedly participated under protest, and claimed that it would satisfy the experience requirement if the earlier five-year period were adopted.

Its technical bids were nevertheless rejected for non-compliance with the prescribed experience criterion.

Respondent No. 11 emerged as the lowest bidder, was awarded the work, and had commenced execution.

The petitioner sought quashing of the impugned tender condition, rejection of its technical bid, and consequential actions including the work order issued to Respondent No. 11.

1. Whether a bidder who knowingly participated in the tender process, allegedly under protest, could challenge the tender conditions and seek invalidation of the process after being declared technically non-responsive?

2. Whether prescribing eligibility criteria, including the financial period for assessing experience, was within the tendering authority’s discretion, and what was the permissible scope of judicial review over such conditions?

The Court applied the doctrine against approbation and reprobation, holding that a party cannot accept and reject the same transaction according to convenience, as explained in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683.

In tender matters, the employer is ordinarily the best judge of its requirements, and courts should not substitute their view for the tendering authority’s commercial or technical judgment. Relying on Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216, the Court held that judicial review is limited to cases involving mala fides, favouritism, arbitrariness, irrationality, or a decision that no reasonable authority could have reached.

Under Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, courts must defer to the employer’s interpretation of its own tender documents unless it is mala fide, perverse, or arbitrary.

Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489, and N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain, (2022) 6 SCC 127, further establish that interference in contractual and technical tender matters must be minimal and reserved for clear cases of arbitrariness, mala fides, bias, or manifest perversity.

The Court held that the petitioner was aware of the eligibility conditions before submitting its bid and voluntarily subjected itself to the notified tender process.

Its representation and alleged participation under protest did not alter the legal position, because it could not challenge the conditions only after its bid was rejected.

On the substantive challenge, the Court found that the petitioner was effectively asking the Court to rewrite the tender by replacing the employer’s chosen experience period with a period that would make the petitioner eligible.

The different periods prescribed for turnover and experience did not, by themselves, establish arbitrariness, discrimination, mala fides, or lack of nexus with the tender’s objective.

No material showed that the condition was tailor-made to favour Respondent No. 11 or to exclude the petitioner alone.

Since the condition applied uniformly to all bidders and the petitioner failed to demonstrate manifest irrationality or any statutory or express prohibition, judicial review was unwarranted.

It held that the petitioner’s participation in the tender process disentitled it from challenging the tender conditions merely because it was declared technically non-responsive.

It further held that the prescribed experience period of 2020–21 to 2024–25 fell within the tendering authority’s discretion and was not shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or perverse.

The writ petition was dismissed, and any pending applications were also disposed of.