Parting possession to sons running independent businesses constitutes subletting despite their familial relationship.

The original defendant No. 1 became a statutory tenant of the suit premises after the death of his father, the original tenant. The respondent-landlord, Shreyas Owners Association, instituted H.R.P. Suit Nos. 8918 and 8919 of 2003 seeking eviction on several grounds, principally that defendant No. 1 had sublet the premises to his sons, defendants Nos. 2 to 4.

The Small Causes Court decreed eviction on 12 May 2008, holding that defendant No. 1 had parted with possession in favour of his sons. The Appellate Bench confirmed the decrees in Regular Civil Appeal Nos. 228 and 229 of 2008 by judgments dated 18 October 2024 and 11 October 2024 respectively.

The petitioners, defendants Nos. 2 to 4, contended that they were conducting business with their father and that their use of the premises did not constitute subletting. They also challenged the respondent-association’s legal status and title to the premises.

During the pendency of the revision applications, possession of the premises had already been recovered by the respondent through execution proceedings.

Whether the courts below erred in holding that defendant No. 1 had sublet or otherwise parted with possession of the suit premises in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 4, thereby attracting the eviction ground under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay/Gujarat Rent Act?

Whether the fact that defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were the sons of the statutory tenant and were conducting business from the premises excluded a finding of subletting?

Whether the petitioners could challenge, at the revisional stage, the respondent-association’s legal status and its entitlement to institute the eviction proceedings?

Whether the concurrent findings and eviction decrees disclosed perversity or gross irregularity warranting interference under Section 29(2) of the Rent Act?

The Court exercised revisional jurisdiction under Section 29(2) of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which permits interference with concurrent findings only where there is material illegality, perversity, or gross irregularity.

The eviction claim was considered under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay/Gujarat Rent Act, concerning unlawful subletting, assignment, or transfer of possession.

The Court also referred to Section 5(11)(c) concerning the status of a family member succeeding to a statutory tenancy.

Relying on Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur, (2005) 1 SCC 31, the Court noted that proof of exclusive possession or parting with possession may shift the evidentiary burden to the tenant to explain the third party’s possession; proof of monetary consideration is not an indispensable requirement for establishing subletting, and the relationship between the tenant and alleged sub-tenant is not determinative.

The Court further applied the tenant’s estoppel under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, preventing a tenant from disputing the landlord’s title while retaining the tenancy.

The trial and appellate courts found, on the defendants’ own admissions and documentary evidence, that defendant No. 1 had ceased conducting his business from the premises since 1985, while defendants Nos. 2 to 4 operated separate proprietary businesses under different names and stored their respective business goods there.

The evidence also showed that the businesses were independently managed, that separate income-tax returns were filed, and that defendant No. 1 did not know the relevant business or financial transactions of his sons.

Applying the principle that exclusive possession by persons other than the contractual tenant, if unexplained, may establish subletting, the Court held that the familial relationship between the parties did not by itself negate the statutory ground of eviction.

The petitioners failed to demonstrate that these concurrent factual findings were perverse or grossly erroneous.

Their challenge to the respondent’s legal status was not entertained because no corresponding issue had been framed or tried and the plea involved mixed questions of fact and law; the title challenge was also restricted by the tenant’s statutory estoppel.

The petitioners established no perversity, illegality, or gross irregularity warranting revisional interference under Section 29(2) of the Rent Act.

Since possession had already been recovered in execution, the Court dismissed both revision applications in limine, made no order as to costs, and disposed of the connected stay applications.