Past contractual experience does not override an eligibility condition requiring present engagement.

The petitioners had been engaged as Itinerant Teachers/Resource Teachers or Special Educators under the Integrated Education for Disabled Scheme in District Maharajganj between 2005 and 2011, with their contractual engagements renewed for successive academic sessions until May 2019.

Their engagements were not renewed for the academic session 2019–20. Their earlier challenge to non-renewal was dismissed by the High Court on 8 July 2025, and the petitioners’ subsequent representations seeking regular appointment were rejected on 15 June 2026.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, including the direction to invite applications from Special Educators working on contract or through outsourcing agencies, the State issued an advertisement dated 13 June 2026 for vacant posts of Special Educators.

General Instruction No. 2 required applicants to produce their contractual, daily-wage or outsourcing engagement orders. Since the petitioners had not been engaged after 2019, they were excluded from the selection process.

During the proceedings, an interim order permitted their participation without insisting upon Instruction No. 2, but directed that the result remain in sealed cover.

The respondents did not file a counter-affidavit, and the matter was finally heard with consent.

Whether General Instruction No. 2 in the advertisement dated 13 June 2026, limiting consideration to Special Educators presently working on contractual, daily-wage or outsourcing-agency basis, was unconstitutional or arbitrary under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution?

Whether the petitioners’ past experience as Special Educators, valid RCI registration and professional qualifications entitled them to participate in the selection despite their not being engaged since 2019?

Whether the High Court could relax or enlarge the eligibility condition prescribed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey?

Whether participation pursuant to the interim order conferred upon the petitioners any vested or enforceable right to have their candidature considered or to obtain appointment?

The Court applied the Supreme Court’s directions in Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, (2021) 17 SCC 1, requiring creation and regular filling of posts of qualified Special Educators and adherence to RCI qualifications.

It relied upon the Supreme Court’s orders dated 7 March 2025 and 5 May 2026, which contemplated screening candidates working on contractual, daily-wage or outsourcing bases, while taking account of past experience and mandatory RCI certification.

The Court applied the permissible-classification test under State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538, namely, intelligible differentia and rational nexus.

It further relied on State of M.P. v. Raghuveer Singh Yadav, (1994) 6 SCC 151, Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2025) 2 SCC 1, and Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade, (2019) 6 SCC 362, for the principle that recruitment eligibility is governed by the advertisement and courts cannot rewrite or substitute prescribed qualifications.

Dr. M.V. Nair v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 429 was applied to distinguish eligibility from suitability.

The Court also relied on Uma Devi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, and M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247, for the rule that contractual or temporary service does not create a right to regular appointment.

The Court also relied on Secretary, UPSC v. S. Krishna Chaitanya, (2011) 14 SCC 227 and Abhimanyoo Ram v. State of U.P., (2008) 17 SCC 73, for the principle that participation under an interim order creates no substantive right.

The Court held that the selection exercise was not a general recruitment open to all persons possessing Special Education qualifications; it was a screening exercise arising from the Supreme Court’s directions for the existing pool of contractual, daily-wage and outsourced Special Educators.

The expression “who were working” was therefore treated as an operative eligibility requirement, and the State validly incorporated that requirement in the advertisement.

Although the petitioners possessed professional qualifications, valid RCI registration and substantial past experience, they had admittedly ceased to work as Special Educators after 2019. Those attributes could not replace the separate condition of present engagement.

The classification was found to have an intelligible basis and a rational nexus with the object of identifying and screening currently engaged Special Educators for the benefit of children with special needs; it was not merely an impermissible distinction between employed and unemployed persons.

The Court further held that enlarging the eligible class to include former contractual teachers would effectively modify the framework prescribed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s binding directions and would amount to rewriting the advertisement.

The petitioners’ failed challenge to non-renewal could not be indirectly revived through the present proceedings.

Their participation pursuant to the interim order also did not create any vested right to selection or appointment.

The petitioners, not having been engaged as Special Educators since 2019, did not fall within the class contemplated by the advertisement and could not claim participation merely on the basis of past service, qualifications or RCI registration.

The Court declined to relax or rewrite the eligibility condition and dismissed the writ petition without awarding costs.

It further clarified that participation permitted under the interim order did not confer any enforceable right to consideration, declaration of results or appointment.