Penalty-only GST proceedings initiated before 1 October 2025 are governed by *Gaurav Jain* on pre-deposit.

The Petitioner challenged a show-cause notice dated 30 June 2025, an order-in-original dated 17 December 2025 imposing penalty for FY 2018–19, and a subsequent order described as a rectification order dated 30 December 2025.

He claimed that he learned of the adjudication order only on 11 May 2026 and disputed effective service, including in light of the later upload of omitted pages; the Respondents maintained that the order had been sent to his registered email address and by Speed Post.

The Petitioner initially challenged the Proper Officer’s authority under Section 122 of the CGST Act but did not press that ground at the hearing.

The Court noted that a statutory appeal was available.

1. Whether the validity and date of service of the order-in-original, the effect of uploading omitted pages, and the resulting limitation period for appeal could be determined in the writ proceedings or should be considered by the Appellate Authority.

2. Whether the Petitioner, whose adjudication resulted in a penalty-only demand and whose show-cause notice pre-dated the amendment effective 1 October 2025, was entitled to the pre-deposit treatment described in *Gaurav Jain* under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act.

3. Whether the period during which the writ petition remained pending would be excluded from limitation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 107(6) of the CGST Act governs the pre-deposit requirement for maintaining a statutory appeal; the Court applied its decision in *Gaurav Jain & Anr. v. Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II), CGST, Delhi Zone & Anr.* (judgment dated 31 July 2026) to the Petitioner’s penalty-only demand arising from a show-cause notice issued before the amendment effective 1 October 2025.

Questions of communication, service, and limitation are to be assessed by the competent Appellate Authority on the evidence and applicable law; the principles in *Luxmi Traders v. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors.* could be raised there, subject to their applicability to the actual modes of service.

Any application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for exclusion of the time spent in the writ proceedings must be considered by the Appellate Authority; filing such an application does not automatically exclude that period.

The Court declined to resolve the disputed service and limitation questions because the parties disagreed about whether, and when, the order had been effectively communicated, and the Respondents asserted service by email and Speed Post in addition to portal-related communication.

Those matters required examination of the evidence by the Appellate Authority, which could also consider the omitted-page upload and *Luxmi Traders*.

By contrast, the Court decided the pre-deposit issue: because the demand was for penalty alone and the show-cause notice preceded the 1 October 2025 amendment, the Petitioner was entitled to the benefit of *Gaurav Jain* for Section 107(6) purposes.

The Court left any request for exclusion under Section 14 to the Appellate Authority, without treating exclusion as automatic.

It left service, limitation, the effect of the omitted-page upload, the merits of the demand, and the unpressed Proper Officer challenge open for consideration by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law.

The Appellate Authority must consider any Section 14 application on its merits; the writ petition and pending applications were disposed of.