Penalty under Section 20 RTI Act requires specific findings of mala fide intent and adherence to natural justice.

The Petitioner, a Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) serving as the Public Information Officer (PIO), received an RTI application dated 24.06.2021 seeking records of a cheque drawn register for the financial year 2017–18

The Petitioner rejected the request on 05.07.2021, stating the information was vague and non-specific under Section 2(f) and 6(1)(b) of the RTI Act

The First Appellate Authority upheld this rejection on 22.10.2021

On the first date of hearing the Second Appeal (07.09.2022), the State Information Commission (Respondent No. 1) passed an order directing the Petitioner to furnish the information at his own cost and initiated penalty proceedings under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI Act without affording the Petitioner a prior hearing

1. Whether the State Information Commission can impose penalties and initiate disciplinary recommendations under Section 20 of the RTI Act without affording the PIO an opportunity of hearing in violation of natural justice

2. Whether the imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) is automatic upon a finding of delay or denial, or if it requires a specific finding of mala fide intent

The court applied Sections 19(3), 20(1), and 20(2) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Section 20(1) mandates that the Commission must give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the PIO before imposing a penalty

The court relied on the Division Bench precedent in Nitin Singhvi v. Chhattisgarh State Information Commission (WA No. 215/2020), which established that penalties are not automatic and require a clear finding of "mala fide" denial or lack of "reasonable cause"

The court also cited Manohar v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 13 SCC 14, which held that penal provisions under the RTI Act must be construed strictly and "negligence" per se is insufficient to trigger Section 20(2)

The Court observed that the Petitioner had provided a reasoned reply and even advised the applicant on how to file a specific request, which was subsequently validated by the First Appellate Authority

The Court reasoned that the State Commission acted mechanically by passing the impugned order on the very first date of hearing without the Petitioner’s presence or reply

Under Section 20, the Commission is legally bound to record a reasoned finding regarding mala fide intent or deliberate obstruction; however, in this case, the Commission ignored the fact that the information sought was vague and lacked particulars required under Section 6(1)(b)

The court noted that because the penalty provisions are quasi-criminal in nature, they cannot be invoked without observing the doctrine of audi alteram partem

The Court answered that the Petitioner's conduct did not warrant penal action as he acted within the law by pointing out the application's vagueness. Consequently, the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 07.09.2022, including the directions for information disclosure, recovery of costs, and the initiation of penalty proceedings under Sections 20(1) and 20(2)