Pendente lite purchaser of undivided share cannot obstruct execution of a final decree for possession against tenants.

The original decree holders (two brothers) filed four suits in 2004 for declaration of title and recovery of possession against tenants.

After protracted litigation, the decrees attained finality following the dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court on 29.09.2021.

During execution proceedings (Ex. Pet. No. 25011/2016), the Appellants—third-party applicants—filed an application under Section 47 r/w Order XXI Rules 97 & 101 of the CPC.

They claimed to have purchased a 50% undivided share in the property via a registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021 from the widow of one of the original decree holders.

They obstructed execution, asserting exclusive possession of a demarcated portion mentioned in their deed's schedule.

The Executing Court rejected the application on 10.10.2025, leading to this statutory appeal.

Whether the Executing Court was justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 read with Section 151 of the CPC?

The court primarily applied the doctrine of *lis pendens* under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which binds a pendente lite purchaser to the outcome of the litigation.

It relied on Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC, which provides a remedy for persons claiming an independent right adverse to the decree, rather than those deriving title from a decree holder.

It further emphasized the principle that a co-owner cannot alienate a specific demarcated portion of joint property without a formal partition.

Section 47 of the CPC, which mandates that questions relating to execution be determined by the Executing Court but does not extend to adjudicating complex inter se title disputes between co-owners.

The Court reasoned that the Appellants are *pendente lite* purchasers who stepped into the shoes of their vendor (a decree holder) during the execution stage; therefore, they cannot assert a right superior to their vendor or obstruct a decree the vendor was actively seeking to enforce.

The Court noted a legal incongruity in the Appellants' sale deed, which purported to sell an "undivided share" while simultaneously demarcating specific boundaries—a practice prohibited in joint tenancy without prior partition.

Furthermore, since the original suit was for recovery of possession from tenants, the decree holders were not in physical possession at the time of sale; thus, the Appellants' claim of "exclusive possession" was factually and legally untenable.

The Court held that Order XXI Rule 97 is intended for strangers with independent titles, not for representatives of decree holders whose rights are inchoate until the decree is fully satisfied and possession is recovered from the tenants.

The appeal was dismissed.

However, the Court clarified that the Appellants are not remediless; as transferees, they are entitled to the fruits of the decree to the extent of their purchased share.

Their substantive remedy lies in supporting the execution to gain possession and subsequently instituting a separate suit for partition against the other co-owners to crystallize their undivided 50% interest.