Permanent injunction is unsustainable where title deeds lack property identification and no recovery of possession is sought.

The appellant (plaintiff) filed a civil suit for a permanent injunction regarding a portion of Abadi land in Village Baloda, measuring 23 feet by 18.9 feet within Khasra No. 3484/1.

The plaintiff claimed the property was ancestral, acquired by his father via a registered sale deed dated December 11, 1933 (Ex.P/1), and that he remained in continuous possession.

He alleged that defendants 1 to 6, with the assistance of the Nagar Panchayat (defendants 7 and 8), attempted to forcibly construct a cultural stage on the land.

The defendants denied the plaintiff’s title and possession, asserting that the stage was constructed on public Abadi land.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding the plaintiff failed to prove title or settled possession.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the 1933 deed and supporting maps (Ex.P/7 and Ex.P/8) established his rights.

Whether the plaintiff established a clear title and identifiable possession of the suit property sufficient to grant a permanent injunction.

Whether a suit for permanent injunction is maintainable when a permanent structure has already been erected on the disputed land without a prayer for recovery of possession.

Whether the Trial Court properly rejected the application for the appointment of a Court Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC.

The Court applied Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) regarding the powers of the appellate court.

It relied on the evidentiary requirements for permanent injunctions, which necessitate proof of both title and settled possession when ownership is disputed.

The Court further applied Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC concerning the appointment of a Commissioner for local investigation.

It distinguished the precedent in Haryana Waqf Board v. Shanti Sarup and others (2008) 8 SCC 671, which held that a Local Commissioner should be appointed to resolve encroachment disputes through demarcation.

However, the Court maintained the principle that a Commissioner cannot be appointed to "fill the gaps" in a party's case or identify property where the primary title deed is fundamentally deficient.

The Court observed that the 1933 sale deed (Ex.P/1) was fatally deficient as it lacked a Khasra number, specific boundaries, or a clear description of the property.

Consequently, the registered document failed to provide an unequivocal right to the land.

The Court found that the maps produced (Ex.P/7 and Ex.P/8) were insufficient to determine the actual physical identity of the suit land or the factum of possession in the absence of a demarcation report or testimony from revenue officials.

Critically, the Court noted that a permanent structure (the stage) had already been constructed on the land; under such circumstances, a suit for a mere permanent injunction is not maintainable without seeking the recovery of possession.

Regarding the Order 26 Rule 9 application, the Court held it was rightly rejected as it was filed at a belated stage to collect evidence for a title deed that failed to define the land.

The Court held that a permanent injunction cannot be granted where the plaintiff fails to identify the suit property through documentary or oral evidence.

Furthermore, a suit for injunction alone is legally unsustainable when the plaintiff is out of possession and a permanent structure has already been raised by the defendants.

The application for a Court Commissioner was deemed an improper attempt to cure a deficient title deed.

No interference with the impugned judgment was warranted.