Personal Hearing is Mandatory under Police Regulation 270 Before Enhancing Punishment via Suo Motu Revision

The petitioner, a retired Town Inspector, was initially appointed as a Sub Inspector in 1966 and promoted to Inspector in 1988.

Following a criminal case registration in 1991, the DIG conducted an inquiry and imposed a minor punishment of a ₹150 fine.

Subsequently, the Inspector General (IG), Indore, exercising suo motu powers under the Police Regulations, set aside the DIG's order and directed a fresh inquiry without issuing a prior notice to the petitioner.

Based on this fresh inquiry, a charge-sheet was issued on July 2, 1992, leading to an order of reversion (punishment).

The petitioner challenged the legality of the suo motu revision and the subsequent punishment orders (Annexures P/1, P/3, and P/7) on the grounds of violation of natural justice.

1. Whether it is mandatory for the reviewing or appellate authority to afford an opportunity of personal hearing to the delinquent officer before enhancing punishment or ordering a fresh inquiry under Police Regulation 270?

2. Whether the failure to provide a personal hearing, despite issuing a show-cause notice, vitiates the revised punishment order?

Regulation 270 of the M.P. Police Regulations, specifically the proviso to Clause 4, which mandates that the revising authority shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the interested parties and an opportunity given to them for being heard.

Sant Lal v. State of MP & Ors. (WA No. 404/2017), which established that a show-cause notice alone is insufficient and a personal hearing is required for suo motu revision.

Fazal Bhai Dhala v. The Custodian-General, Evacuee Property (AIR 1961 SC 1397), emphasizing that the "reasonable opportunity of being heard" includes the right to appear personally or through counsel to contest prejudicial modifications.

The court examined the procedural history and found that while the IG possessed the competency to review the DIG’s order under Regulation 270(1), the exercise of this power was subject to the procedural safeguards in the proviso to Regulation 270(4).

The court observed that although a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, no personal hearing was granted before the IG set aside the original punishment of a fine to initiate a more severe inquiry.

Applying the ratio from Sant Lal, the court reasoned that the words "opportunity given to them for being heard" in the Police Regulation imply a physical or personal hearing, especially when a minor penalty is being converted into a major one or a settled order is being reversed.

Consequently, the IG's action was deemed a violation of the principles of natural justice and statutory requirements.

The court quashed the impugned orders—Annexure P-1 (03.02.2006), Annexure P-3 (20.03.1992), and Annexure P-7 (17.10.1994). The respondents were directed to provide all consequential benefits to the petitioner within three months. Since the petitioner had already retired, the court denied the State liberty to initiate fresh proceedings.